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CHOOSING BALANCE: CONGRESSIONAL
POWERS AND THE PARTIAL-BIRTH
ABORTION BAN ACT OF 2003
Alissa Schecter*
"The powers of the legislature are defined and limited; and that
those limits may not be mistaken, or forgotten, the constitution is
written."'
INTRODUCTION
Eight months into the pregnancy, tragedy hit. Vicki had picked a
name for her baby and completed decorating his new room when she
heard the tragic news; the baby boy she carried had at least nine major
abnormalities, including a fluid-filled cranium with no brain tissue,
compacted, flattened vertebrae, congenital hip dysplasia, skeletal
dysplasia, and hyperteloric eyes.2 Vicki's doctor told her that the baby
would never survive outside the womb, advising her to terminate the
pregnancy if she wanted to live and if she ever wanted to have another
child.3 After a sleepless night despairing over this decision, Vicki and
her husband decided to terminate the pregnancy with a partial-birth
abortion.4 Vicki and her husband felt they had no choice; the doctor
told them she had no other options. Since that time, Vicki has
become pregnant again and delivered a healthy son.5 Vicki is a
woman who wanted to be a mother, yet confronted a tragic medical
emergency.6
Were Vicki to face the same dilemma today, she would lack the
freedom to abort the fetus to save her own life and preserve her
ability to have another baby.7 President George W. Bush signed the
* J.D. Candidate, 2006, Fordham University School of Law; B.A., Tufts University,
2003. I would like to thank my parents for their unending support; my sisters for
keeping me laughing; Aaron for his patience and limitless encouragement; and
Professor Robin A. Lenhardt for her helpful feedback and guidance.
1. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137,176 (1803).
2. 149 Cong. Rec. S12927-02,12929 (daily ed. Oct. 21, 2003) (statement of Sen.
Durbin). Vicki described the pregnancy as "disgustingly normal." Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
1987
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Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act ("PBABA") into law on November 5,
2003.8 The PBABA restricts a woman's right to choose to have
certain types of abortions, including the procedure chosen by Vicki. 9
This statute conflicts with the precedent set in Stenberg v. Carhart,
which struck down a state statute criminalizing partial-birth abortions
due to its vagueness and lack of an exception for the health of the
pregnant woman." Under Stenberg, Vicki possessed the option of a
partial-birth abortion since her life and health were in jeopardy.
Nevertheless, through the PBABA, Congress seeks to override the
U.S. Supreme Court and restrict this right. As a result, three district
courts responded by declaring the PBABA unconstitutional, citing
due process violations, declaring the law unconstitutionally vague, and
finding an undue burden on pregnant women seeking abortions."
With the newly elected Republican-controlled Congress after the 2004
election, the political climate of the United States is moving towards a
more conservative, anti-abortion stance. 2 This is especially important
given that by the time the Supreme Court considers the
constitutionality of the PBABA, there may be different Justices on
the bench. 3
While many scholars contend the PBABA is unconstitutional on
due process grounds, 14 this Note focuses on the root of the issue -
generally, congressional authority, and specifically, whether Congress
possesses the power to enact the PBABA. This Note argues that the
PBABA is unconstitutional, advocating for congressional restraint
when enacting legislation dealing with partial-birth abortion. Partial-
birth abortion lies within the states' domain; Congress may not
8. Pub. L. No. 108-105, § 3,117 Stat. 1201 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1531).
9. 149 Cong. Rec. S12927-02, S12929 (daily ed. Oct. 21, 2003) (statement of Sen.
Durbin).
10. Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000); infra notes 77-84 and accompanying
text.
11. See infra notes 172-89 and accompanying text.
12. See Carl Hulse, Abortion Remark by G.O.P. Senator Puts Heat on Peers, N.Y.
Times, Nov. 6, 2004, at Al (noting that "the expanded Republican Senate majority is
strongly anti-abortion"); Robin Toner, Changing Senate Looks Much Better to
Abortion Foes, N.Y. Times, Dec. 2, 2004, at A34 (claiming that "[a]s a result of
November's election, the next Senate will have a bigger, more conservative
Republican majority and several new opponents of abortion-including some of the
most intense abortion foes in politics" and that Bush's conservative supporters expect
his Supreme Court nominees to be opponents of Roe v. Wade).
13. See Hulse, supra note 12, at A12 (explaining that "Democrats say they fear
that the Bush administration intends to use its second term to nominate judges
interested in striking down abortion laws").
14. See, e.g., Alex Gordon, The Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, 41 Harv. J.
on Legis. 501 (2004); Tamara F. Kushnir, Comment, It's My Body, It's My Choice:
The Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, 35 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 1117, 1162-88 (2004).
But see Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Worst Constitutional Decision of All Time, 78
Notre Dame L. Rev. 995, 1000 (2003) (arguing that the Supreme Court "has rarely in
its history been so cavalier, so confident, so cocky, and so prolific in striking down
legislative acts").
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employ the Commerce Clause"5 or Section Five of the Fourteenth
Amendment 16 to enact a federal ban on partial-birth abortions.
Partial-birth abortion procedures are not economic in nature and do
not substantially affect interstate commerce. Moreover, the PBABA
restricts a woman's fundamental right to choose, and the Commerce
Clause and Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment do not afford
Congress the power to enact legislation such as the PBABA. 7 By
attempting to override the Supreme Court, Congress is overstepping
its boundaries, blurring the line separating judicial and legislative
powers. When dealing with such a nationally divisive issue, such as
abortion, Congress should respect the balance of powers, and not
impose its will on the nation, undermining important federalism
precedent.
Part I of this Note outlines the history of the debate over the right
to abortion and the different abortion procedures relevant to the
partial-birth abortion discussion. It also analyzes Congress's powers
under the Commerce Clause and Section Five of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Part II discusses the controversy over Congress's power
to enact certain legislation, specifically the PBABA. Part III argues
that partial-birth abortion is primarily a state issue rather than a
federal issue. It points to the Commerce Clause and Section Five,
demonstrating that Congress lacks the power to legislate over partial-
birth abortions, thereby rendering the PBABA unconstitutional.
I. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE RIGHT TO AN ABORTION AND THE
DEVELOPMENT OF CONGRESSIONAL POWERS UNDER THE
COMMERCE CLAUSE AND SECTION FIVE OF THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT
By enacting the PBABA, Congress asserted its purported right to
pass legislation restricting a woman's right to have an abortion. It
relied on the Commerce Clause and Section Five of the Fourteenth
Amendment, undermining previous Supreme Court decisions
prohibiting such legislation by the states. Building on precedent, the
Supreme Court recognizes that the fundamental right to privacy
extends to a woman's right to choose to have an abortion.
Nonetheless, with the PBABA, Congress seeks to restrict that right
using its power to govern interstate commerce and its authority to
enforce provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment.
15. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (granting Congress the power "[t]o regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian
Tribes").
16. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 5 (stating that "Congress shall have power to
enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article").
17. See infra Part III.
19892005]
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A. The Fundamental Right to an Abortion
The recognition of the right to privacy laid the groundwork for
giving women the right to obtain an abortion.18 In Griswold v.
Connecticut,9 Justice Douglas, writing for the majority, noted that
while neither the First,20 Third,2' Fourth,22 Fifth,23 nor Ninth24
Amendments explicitly mentions a right to privacy, the amendments
create penumbras that protect privacy from governmental intrusion.
18. Justice Harlan's dissent in Poe v. Ullman was the first judicial argument for
the modern right to privacy. 367 U.S. 497, 522-55 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). He
states that "the concept of 'privacy' embodied in the Fourth Amendment is part of
the 'ordered liberty' assured against state action by the Fourteenth Amendment." Id.
at 549 (citing Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25
(1949)). Justice Harlan cited Olmstead v. United States:
"[The makers of our Constitution] conferred, as against the Government,
the right to be let alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the right
most valued by civilized men. To protect that right, every unjustifiable
intrusion by the Government upon the privacy of the individual, whatever
the means employed, must be deemed a violation of the Fourth
Amendment."... [T]he Constitution protects the privacy of the home
against all unreasonable intrusion of whatever character.
Id. at 550 (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting)). Justice Harlan also noted that these principles pertain to all government
invasions into the privacies of a person's home and life. Id. (citing Boyd v. United
States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886)).
19. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
20. U.S. Const. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble,
and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances."); see Griswold, 381 U.S.
at 482-83 (explaining that certain forms of speech and association are not expressly
included in the First Amendment, but are crucial to give full meaning to the rights).
21. U.S. Const. amend. III ("No Soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any
house, without the consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be
prescribed by law."); see Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484 (noting that the Third Amendment
is one component of the right to privacy).
22. U.S. Const. amend. IV ("The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures .... "); see
Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485 (recognizing that the Fourth Amendment creates a right to
privacy).
23. U.S. Const. amend. V ("No person shall be ... compelled in any criminal case
to be a witness against himself .. "); see Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484 (discussing that
the right to be free from self-incrimination allows a citizen to create a zone of privacy
which he is under no obligation to surrender).
24. U.S. Const. amend. IX ("The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain
rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.").
Justice Goldberg's concurrence in Griswold focused on the Ninth Amendment,
pointing to James Madison's original purpose for including the Amendment in the
Bill of Rights: to ease the fears of those who worried that rights not enumerated
would be insecure. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 489-90 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (citing I
Annals of Congress 439 (Gales & Seaton eds., 1834)). Looking to the framers of the
Constitution, Goldberg asserted that the first eight amendments are not the only basic
and fundamental rights granted by the Constitution. Id. at 490 (Goldberg, J.,
concurring).
25. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484. The Court found the Connecticut statutes
(prohibiting the distribution of information or advice on contraception to married
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Using the reasoning from Griswold, the Court in Eisenstadt v.
Baird6 extended the right of privacy to unmarried people. 7
Eisenstadt laid the groundwork for Roe v. Wade,28 holding that "[i]f
the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual,
married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental
intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the
decision whether to bear or beget a child.
29
Then, in Roe, the Court recognized that the fundamental right of
privacy included a woman's right to have an abortion ° by affirming
the unconstitutionality of a state abortion law.3' Justice Blackmun's
opinion for the Court asserted that the state only has an interest in
potential life when viability occurs-in the third trimester.3 2 Viability
occurs when the fetus becomes capable of independent life outside the
womb.33
Justice Blackmun established the trimester test to determine the
fetus's point of viability, and thus the emergence of a sufficiently
people) overly broad, invading areas of protected freedoms. Id. at 485. The Court
insisted that it was not using Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), as a guide.
Griswold, 381 U.S. at 482. The Court did not want to appear to be sitting as a "super-
legislature," determining "the wisdom, need, and propriety of laws that touch
economic problems, business affairs, or social conditions." Id. It insisted that the law
in question "operates directly on an intimate relation of husband and wife and their
physician's role in one aspect of that relation." Id. In his concurrence, Justice Harlan
used the Fourteenth Amendment to find a right to privacy. Id. at 499-502 (Harlan, J.,
concurring). He emphasized that the Connecticut statutes under review violated
"basic values 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty."' Id. at 500 (citing Palko v.
Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937) (Harlan, J., concurring)). He stressed that
judicial restraint in interpreting the Due Process Clause could be achieved only with
respect for history, recognition of our society's basic values, and an appreciation of
the separation of powers. Id. at 501. Justice White's concurrence noted the
significance of the right invaded by the challenged statute, necessitating strict scrutiny
review. Id. at 503-05 (rejecting the statutes because of a failure to notice how the
state's ban on married couples' use of contraceptives advanced the state's interest in
banning illicit sexual relationships). When laws infringe on constitutionally protected
personal rights, the laws are subject to strict scrutiny review. City of Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985). Courts will uphold the laws only if
they are "suitably tailored to serve a compelling state interest." Id. (citing Graham v.
Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964)).
For a further discussion of the scrutiny standards, see K.G. Jan Pillai, Phantom of the
Strict Scrutiny, 31 New Eng. L. Rev. 397 (1997). Justice Black and Justice Stewart
dissented in Griswold. 381 U.S. at 507-31 (strictly construing the Constitution and
thus finding no right to privacy).
26. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
27. Id. at 452-53 (broadening the right to privacy to include the right of unmarried
couples to obtain contraception).
28. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
29. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453.
30. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153 (stating that the right of privacy, whether found in the
Fourteenth Amendment or the Ninth Amendment "is broad enough to encompass a
woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy").
31. Id. at 166.
32. Id. at 160.
33. Id.
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compelling state interest.34  Under Roe, in the first trimester of
pregnancy, the state lacks a compelling interest, placing the decision
to have an abortion between a woman and her doctor.35 In the second
trimester, the state develops a compelling interest in the pregnant
woman's health.36  Therefore, the state may impose rules and
regulations that affect the health of pregnant women.37 A fetus's
viability occurs in the third trimester, because the fetus can survive
independently outside the womb, leading to a state's compelling
interest in the potential life.38 At this point, a woman's right to an
abortion becomes limited to situations where her life or health
(mental or physical health or imminent psychological harm) is in
jeopardy.39
The decision in Roe recognizes that a pregnant woman possesses a
"specific constitutional right to privacy in matters of procreation,"
including the right to an abortion.4° Additionally, the finding that a
fetus is not a "person" gives states the freedom to restrict abortion; if
a fetus were a person entitled to constitutional protection, the
Constitution would require states to have a compelling reason for not
outlawing abortion.4'
Scholars and legislators cite Roe as the case establishing the right to
abortion, and since that landmark decision, abortion opponents have
fought to reverse the decision; indeed, many thought the Supreme
Court would overturn Roe.42 In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey,4 3 the Supreme Court upheld Roe, but altered
34. Id. at 163.
35. Id at 163-64.
36. Id.
37. Id. (giving examples of permissible state regulations: qualification
requirements for the abortion provider, licensure of abortion provider, regulation of
the facility, and licensing of the facility in which the abortion is to be performed
(hospital, clinic, etc.)).
38. Id. at 163-65.
39. Id. at 153, 163-65.
40. Ronald Dworkin, Life's Dominion: An Argument About Abortion,
Euthanasia, and Individual Freedom 105 (1993).
41. Id. at 110.
42. See Janis L. McDonald, Book Review, 46 Am. J. Legal Hist. 104 (2004)
(reviewing N.E.H. Hull & Peter Charles Hoffer, Roe v. Wade: The Abortion Rights
Controversy in American History (2001)). Many people thought that when the Court
revisited the landmark Roe in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), the judges would undermine Roe. Dworkin, supra note 40,
at 152. The Justices, however, chose to use Casey to affirm and explain Roe,
explaining the basic constitutional, social, political, economic, and legal foundations
of the opinion. Casey, 505 U.S. at 864-79.
43. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). In between Roe and Casey, the Supreme Court heard
other cases involving abortion. See, e.g., Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991)
(declaring it permissible for a state to prohibit doctors in federally funded clinics from
discussing abortion, even if a patient requests information and even if the physician
thinks an abortion is necessary); Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990) (finding
unconstitutional a requirement that both parents be notified of minor's abortion
decision, but deeming constitutional a statute's provision requiring two-parent
[Vol. 731992
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its holding by adding restrictions to when a woman could seek an
abortion." It also reviewed issues not resolved by Roe.45  The
Supreme Court moved away from the trimester system because
medical studies undermined the trimester analysis utilized by Justice
Blackmun in Roe." Nonetheless, the Court upheld the fundamental
right to abortion articulated in Roe, entrenching it in American
society and jurisprudence.47 Casey recognized the states' rights to pass
laws curtailing the right to abortion up to the point where the law
places an undue burden on the exercise of a woman's right to an
abortion.48 Under the new Casey test, a physician determines the
point of a fetus's viability.49 Consistent with Roe, after the fetus is
capable of life outside the womb, a pregnant woman may secure an
abortion only when her health or life is threatened. 0 While Casey
added some restrictions on a woman's right to choose, by reaffirming
Roe, it embedded in constitutional law the freedom of a woman to
choose to have an abortion. 1
With these cases, the Supreme Court instituted the right to privacy
and the right of a woman to obtain an abortion. Once Roe and Casey
established a woman's fundamental right to an abortion before the
point of a fetus's viability, politicians and activists began fighting to
ensure the ban on a different type of abortion commonly known as
partial-birth abortion.52
notification unless pregnant minor obtains judicial bypass); Webster v. Reprod.
Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989) (determining that a state may ban the use of public
employees and facilities for performance or assistance of abortions); Thornburgh v.
Am. Coll. of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986) (determining that
the states may not intimidate women into continuing their pregnancies under the
pretext of protecting potential life or maternal health); Planned Parenthood Ass'n v.
Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476 (1983) (finding a requirement that abortions be performed in a
hospital after twelve weeks of pregnancy unconstitutional, but finding constitutional
requirements of a pathology report for each abortion performed, that a second
physician be present during post-viability abortions, and that a minor secure parental
consent or consent from a court for an abortion); City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for
Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416 (1983) (noting that while a state may require a
physician to give informed consent prior to performing an abortion, it may not insist
upon a lengthy, inflexible list of warnings that create obstacles to the procedure).
44. See infra notes 46-50 and accompanying text.
45. Dworkin, supra note 40, at 153.
46. Casey, 505 U.S. at 873.
47. Id. at 864-65.
48. Id. at 877 (defining "undue burden" as something that amounts to a
substantial obstacle).
49. Id. at 884.
50. Id. at 871 (using language similar to Roe).
51. Dworkin, supra note 40, at 171-76 (claiming that Casey not only endorsed Roe,
but also demonstrated a change in the Court's appreciation for why Roe was correct).
52. See NARAL, "Partial-Birth Abortions": Anti-Choice Leaders Reveal True
Intentions, available at
http://www.naral.org/facts/loader.cfm?url=/commonspot/security/getfile.cfm&PagelD
=5464 (last visited Jan. 25, 2005).
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B. Partial-Birth Abortions and the Supreme Court
In Stenberg v. Carhart,53 the Supreme Court, in a five to four
decision, struck down as unconstitutional a Nebraska statute54 banning
partial-birth abortions. Partial-birth abortion, a nonmedical term,
refers to the procedure by which a physician partially delivers a fetus
before aborting it.55  The banned procedure accounts for
approximately 2220 abortions per year, or 0.17% of all abortions.56
Approximately ninety percent of all abortions performed in the
United States take place during the first trimester of pregnancy using
vacuum aspiration. 7 The remaining ten percent of all abortions occur
during the second trimester of pregnancy. 8 The most commonly used
procedure during the second trimester is "dilation and evacuation"
("D&E"), which doctors perform between the thirteenth and fifteenth
week of gestation. 9 The procedure resembles vacuum aspiration,
except the cervix is more widely dilated so that physicians may
remove larger pieces of tissue.6 ° Physicians often use osmotic dilators,
sometimes for as long as two days.6' Physicians often do not remove
the fetus intact, because the fetal tissue is "friable" and easily
The partial-birth abortion strategy was designed to: a) emphasize the horror
of partial-birth abortion to the general public by, b) introducing legislation
to outlaw it, thus c) exposing pro-abortion legislators who would oppose the
legislation for the brutes that they are, causing them to be unseated. This
was a sure win (so we were told), and once partial-birth abortion was
outlawed, then we could move on to outlawing other forms of abortion.
Id.
53. 530 U.S. 914 (2000).
54. Neb. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 28-328(1) (Michie Supp. 1999) ("No partial birth
abortion shall be performed in this state, unless such procedure is necessary to save
the life of the mother whose life is endangered by a physical disorder, physical illness,
or physical injury, including a life-endangering physical condition caused by or arising
from the pregnancy itself."). The Nebraska statute defined "partial birth abortion" as
"an abortion procedure in which the person performing the abortion partially delivers
vaginally a living unborn child before killing the unborn child and completing the
delivery." Id. § 28-326(9). The statute clarifies by defining the partial delivery as
"deliberately and intentionally delivering into the vagina a living unborn child, or a
substantial portion thereof, for the purpose of performing a procedure that the person
performing such procedure knows will kill the unborn child and does kill the unborn
child." Id.
55. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1531 (West Supp. 2004); Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 922.
56. See Kushnir, supra note 14, at 1177 (citing Mary Ellen Schneider, Bush Signs
Partial-Birth Abortion Ban, Ob. Gyn. News, Dec. 1, 2003, at 1).
57. Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 923 (citing Ctrs. for Disease Control and Prevention,
Abortion Surveillance-United States, 1996, at 41 (July 30, 1999)). Vacuum
aspiration involves "insertion of a vacuum tube (cannula) into the uterus to evacuate
the contents." Id.
58. Id. at 924 (citing Ctrs. for Disease Control and Prevention, Abortion
Surveillance-United States, 1996, at 41 (July 30, 1999)).
59. Id. at 924-25.
60. Id.
61. Id. Dilation for two days may cause fetal death. Kushnir, supra note 14, at
1140.
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broken.62 After removing the fetus, the physician scrapes the walls of
the uterus to ensure that no tissue remains.63
After fifteen weeks, doctors employ a different procedure to abort
the fetus. "Because the fetus is larger at this stage of gestation
(particularly the head), and because bones are more rigid,
dismemberment or other destructive procedures are more likely to be
required than at earlier gestational ages to remove fetal and placental
tissue."'  After twenty weeks, "[slome physicians use intrafetal
potassium chloride or digoxin to induce fetal demise prior to a late
D&E ... to facilitate evacuation." 65
The D&E abortion procedure entails certain risks. 66 Physicians use
mechanisms within the uterus, creating a danger of puncturing and
harm to nearby organs.67  Fetal bone fragments may be sharp and
cause similar damage.68 Physicians may leave behind fetal tissue,
which can cause infection and other damage.69 Studies find, however,
that the D&E method (performed between the twelfth and twentieth
week of gestation) entails less risk of mortality and complication than
labor-inducing procedures.7"
When the fetal skull is too large to fit through the cervix, a
physician will perform a dilation and extraction ("D&X") abortion,
which is similar to the intact D&E procedure.71 The physician will
dilate the cervix and remove the fetus from the uterus through the
cervix in one pass. 2 The physician "pulls the fetal body through the
cervix, collapses the skull, and extracts the fetus through the cervix."73
According to some experts, D&X offers certain advantages over the
D&E procedure.74 However, other experts consider the D&X
62. Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 924-25. If the fetus is removed intact, it is called an
"intact D&E." Kushnir, supra note 14, at 1140.
63. Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 924-25.
64. Id. at 925 (internal citation and quotation omitted).
65. Id. (internal citation and quotation omitted).
66. Id. at 926.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 926-27 (citations omitted).
71. Id. at 927.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. See Nat'l Abortion Fed'n v. Ashcroft, 330 F. Supp. 2d 436, 470-71 (2004)
(explaining witnesses' expert testimony). Plaintiff's testimony demonstrated that as
compared to D&E, D&X offers four safety advantages that decrease the risk of
infection. Id. D&X is also safer for women with certain medical conditions and when
the fetus contains certain abnormalities. Id. at 471. During a D&X procedure, a
physician inserts forceps into the uterus fewer times than during a D&E procedure,
which reduces the risk of uterine perforation. Id. (citation omitted).
2005] 1995
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
procedure to be riskier, creating more health hazards for the pregnant
woman.
75
Many states enacted legislation banning these procedures, known as
partial-birth abortions.76 Because the Supreme Court initially failed to
address the legitimacy of partial-birth abortion bans, states felt free to
enact legislation in their own manner, protected by the political
atmosphere at the time. However, when a physician challenged a
Nebraska partial-birth abortion ban statute in Stenberg, the Supreme
Court granted certiorari, establishing the rules by which states could
control partial-birth abortions.
The Court in Stenberg reasoned that: (1) the D&X procedure has
potential benefits over other abortion procedures in certain cases;77
(2) the statute lacked an exception for the health of the pregnant
woman as required by Casey;78 and (3) as discussed in Justice
O'Connor's concurrence, the statute imposed an undue burden on the
woman seeking the abortion, because it applied to procedures on both
pre- and post-viable fetuses.79 States' interests in regulating abortions
of pre-viable fetuses are "considerably weaker" than of post-viable
fetuses.80 The Court relied on Roe and Casey, which require that any
post-viability abortion regulation must contain a health exception."
Stenberg retains the requirement that a pre-viability abortion
regulation must, at a minimum, contain a health exception." The
Court found that the Nebraska statute did not further a state interest
"in the potentiality of human life"; rather, it regulated particular
abortion procedures instead of focusing on saving fetuses.8 3 Without
the health exception, the Nebraska statute violated the requirement
that a state "may promote but not endanger a woman's health when it
75. Id. (noting that the government's witnesses testified that D&X procedures are
dangerous and risky for the pregnant woman). The experts testified that while D&E
involves a higher frequency of instruments in the uterine, if performed correctly,
there is no increased risk of perforation. Id. While D&X may entail less risk of
cervical laceration, other aspects of the procedure ("such as the greater cervical
dilation or the fact that the fetus's head is crushed in proximity to the cervix") may
lead to a greater risk of uterine perforation. Id. (citation omitted).
76. See Karen E. Walther, Comment, Partial-Birth Abortion: Should Moral
Judgment Prevail Over Medical Judgment?, 31 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 693, 707 n.121 (2000)
(listing thirty states that banned partial-birth abortion procedures as of 2000).
77. Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 931-46.
78. Id. at 930-46 (finding that although D&X is a rare procedure, it may be safer
than the D&E procedure in some circumstances, and thus must be permitted if the
pregnant woman's health is in danger).
79. Id. at 950-51 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (claiming that the statute did not
distinguish between the D&E and D&X methods, and thus the vague language led to
both procedures being banned).
80. Id. at 930 (citing Planned Parenthood of Southeast Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,
870 (1992)).
81. See supra notes 35-50 and accompanying text.
82. Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 930 (citing Casey, 505 U.S. at 880).
83. Id. (internal quotation omitted).
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regulates the methods of abortion."'  Through its reasoning in
Stenberg, the Court reaffirmed Roe and Casey with respect to partial-
birth abortion bans.
C. Federal Partial-Birth Abortion Bans
Even though the Supreme Court deemed a statute banning partial-
birth abortions unconstitutional due to its vagueness and lack of a
health exception for the pregnant woman, Congress still has sought to
implement similar legislation. Between 1995 and 2003, Congress
attempted to pass a partial-birth abortion ban five times.8" The House
of Representatives voted to pass the Partial-Birth Abortion Act of
1995 with a vote of 288-139.86 The Senate, voting fifty-four to forty-
four, missed the two-thirds requirement to overturn a presidential
veto.87 President Clinton vetoed the bill because it did not contain an
exception for the pregnant woman's life.88 In 1997, Congress made
another attempt to pass the legislation, yet the Senate failed to
provide the necessary two-thirds vote, and President Clinton again
vetoed the bill for lack of a health exception,89 due to the precedent
set by Casey.
In 2002, Congress once again deliberated over the bill.90 The 108th
Congress passed the PBABA and President Bush signed the bill into
law on November 5, 2003. 91 The PBABA of 2003 states that:
84. Id. at 931 (citing Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians and Gynecologists,
476 U.S. 747, 768-69 (1986); Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 400 (1979); Planned
Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 76-79 (1976); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 197
(1973)).
85. Kushnir, supra note 14, at 1148-52.
86. See Off. of the Clerk, U.S. House of Representatives, Final Vote Results for
Roll Call 756, available at http://clerk.house.gov/evs/1995/rol1756.xml (last visited Jan.
26, 2005).
87. See Senate Bill Clerk, U.S. Senate Roll Call Votes 104th Congress, 1st Session,
at
http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll-call lists/roll callvote cfm.cfm?congress=
104&session=l&vote=00596 (last visited Jan. 26, 2005); see also U.S. Const. art. I, § 7,
cl. 2 (giving Congress the power to override a presidential veto by a two-thirds vote of
members of both the House and the Senate).
88. Kushnir, supra note 14, at 1149 (citing Carol Jouzaitis, Clinton Vetoes Late-
term Abortion Curb, Chi. Trib., Apr. 11, 1996, at 3 (noting President Clinton's
position against the bill because of its lack of a health exception), available at 1996
WL 2660913).
89. Id. at 1150 (citation omitted). Both houses of the 106th Congress passed a
partial-birth abortion ban in different versions in 1999, which President Clinton again
vetoed. See An Act To Amend Title 18, United States Code, To Ban Partial-Birth
Abortions, H.R. 3660, 106th Cong. (2000), available at
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=106_cong-bills&docid=f:h3660eh.txt.pdf; An Act To Amend
Title 18, United States Code, To Ban Partial-Birth Abortions, S. 1692, 106th Cong.
(1999), available at http:// frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=106_cong_ bills&docid=f:s1692es.txt.pdf.
90. Kushnir, supra note 14, at 1151.
91. Id. at 1118, 1152.
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Any physician who, in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce,
knowingly performs a partial-birth abortion and thereby kills a
human fetus shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more
than 2 years, or both. This subsection does not apply to a partial-
birth abortion that is necessary to save the life of a mother whose
life is endangered by a physical disorder, physical illness, or physical
injury, including a life-endangering physical condition caused by or
arising from the pregnancy itself.
92
The PBABA makes no exception for injuries that are less than life-
threatening.93 The statute also includes a "Findings" section, where
Congress declares partial-birth abortion "a gruesome and inhumane
procedure that is never medically necessary and should be
prohibited."94 Rejecting Stenberg, the Findings state that partial-birth
abortions create a risk to the pregnant woman, lack approval in the
medical community, and are never necessary to preserve the pregnant
woman's health.95 They further proclaim that Congress need not
92. 18 U.S.C.A § 1531(a) (West Supp. 2004). The statute defines "partial-birth
abortion" as a procedure in which a physician
deliberately and intentionally vaginally delivers a living fetus until, in the
case of a head-first presentation, the entire fetal head is outside the body of
the mother, or, in the case of breech presentation, any part of the fetal trunk
past the navel is outside the body of the mother, for the purpose of
performing an overt act that the person knows will kill the partially
delivered living fetus; and ... performs the overt act, other than completion
of delivery, that kills the partially delivered living fetus.
Id. § 1531(b)(l)(A)-(B). This definition uses nearly the same language as the
Nebraska statute struck down in Stenberg. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
93. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1531.
94. See The Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-105, § 2(1),
117 Stat. 1201 (2003) (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1531); 149 Cong. Rec. S3456-
02,3458 (daily ed. Mar. 11, 2003) (statement of Sen. Frist) (describing the partial-birth
abortion procedure as "repulsive" and stating, as a physician, that "[n]ever has
partial-birth abortion ... been the only procedure or the best procedure available in
the case of a medical emergency"). Senator Frist argues that the only "advantage" of
a partial-birth abortion is the "guarantee... of a dead infant." Id. at S3458.
95. See § 2(1)-(2), 117 Stat. at 1201. But see 149 Cong. Rec. H9135-05,44 (daily ed.
Oct. 2, 2003) (statement of Rep. Nadler) (stating that "Congress is not a doctor, and
certainly Congress is not the doctor in a particular procedure performed on a
particular woman. Only her doctor, who knows her medical condition, can decide
what is medically necessary"); 149 Cong. Rec. S11454-01,11456 (daily ed. Sept. 15,
2003) (Letter from Am. Pub. Health Ass'n, to the House of Representatives (Mar. 31,
2003) (referring to partial-birth abortions as "medically accepted" procedures)); see
also Nat'l Abortion Fed'n v. Ashcroft, 330 F. Supp. 2d 436, 449-51 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)
(listing those organizations opposing the PBABA: American College Of
Obstetricians and Gynecologists ("ACOG," a professional organization of board
certified obstetricians and gynecologists); American Medical Women's Association
("AMWA," a group of female physicians, residents, and medical students); the
American Public Health Association ("APHA"); Physicians for Reproductive Choice
and Health ("PRCH," a professional organization of practicing obstetricians and
gynecologists and academics); American Nurses Association ("ANA," a professional
organization representing registered nurses); Nursing's Agenda for the Future
("NAF"); the California Medical Association ("CMA"); the Maine Medical
Association ("MMA"); and the Association of Reproductive Health Professionals
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accept the Supreme Court's findings with respect to the health
exception requirement because the congressional findings determine
that a health exception is not necessary in this situation, yet the
Supreme Court must afford great deference to Congress's findings.9"
Immediately following the enactment of the PBABA, physicians and
activists challenged this opposition to Stenberg.97  Nonetheless,
PBABA supporters insisted that Congress possessed the power to
enact the PBABA under the Commerce Clause and Section Five of
the Fourteenth Amendment.98
D. Congress's Powers of Enactment
Historically, the Supreme Court recognized Congress's broad
powers to legislate under the Commerce Clause and Section Five of
the Fourteenth Amendment.99 Congress purported to rely on these
two measures when enacting the PBABA.1 "
1. Congressional Powers Under the Commerce Clause
In United States v. Lopez, the Supreme Court clarified Congress's
powers under the Commerce Clause. 1 ' Before Lopez, many
commentators viewed the Commerce Clause as giving overly
sweeping regulatory power to Congress." In the fifty years prior to
Lopez, the Supreme Court did not strike down any legislation on
("ARHP"). But see also id. at 452 (noting associations that supported the PBABA:
PHACT (an organization of physicians, mostly obstetricians and gynecologists, which
specifically addresses the partial-birth abortion debate) and the Association of
American Physicians & Surgeons ("AAPS")).
96. See § 2(3)-(13), 117 Stat. at 1201; Gordon, supra note 14, at 508 (quoting Rep.
James Sensenbrenner (R-Wis.) as conceding that the Supreme Court was not
required to accept congressional findings, but hoping that the Court would "give the
same type of deference that it has done in the past civil rights and employment cases"
(quotations and citation omitted)).
97. See Jeff Kunerth, Bush Signs Abortion Bill; The Ban on a Type of Late-Term
Abortion Procedure Brought Immediate Legal Challenges, Orlando Sentinel Trib.,
Nov. 6, 2003, at Al; Renuka Rayasam, Abortion Law Sparks Suits Before Ink Dries,
The Atlanta J.-Const., Nov. 6, 2003, at Al; Maura Reynolds, Bush Signs Bill to Ban a
Type of Abortion; Challenges are Filed, and a Federal Judge in Nebraska Quickly
Issues a Temporary Restraining Order, L.A. Times, Nov. 6, 2003, at Al.
98. See generally infra notes 207-10, 221-26, 232-38, 253-58, 271 and accompanying
text (discussing congressional powers pursuant to the Commerce Clause and Section
Five of the Fourteenth Amendment and the PBABA).
99. See infra notes 101-66 and accompanying text.
100. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1531 (West Supp. 2004); § 2, 117 Stat. at 1201.
101. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
102. Diane McGimsey, Comment, The Commerce Clause and Federalism After
Lopez and Morrison: The Case for Closing the Jurisdictional-Element Loophole, 90
Cal. L. Rev. 1675, 1678 (2002) (citing Judge Alex Kozinski, Introduction to Volume
Nineteen, 19 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 1, 5 (1995) (noting that before Lopez, many
viewed the Commerce Clause as the "Hey, you-can-do-whatever-you-feel-like
Clause")).
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grounds that Congress surpassed its Commerce Clause powers.103
Through Lopez, the Supreme Court set boundaries for Commerce
Clause legislation."'
In Lopez, police arrested the defendant for possessing a firearm in
violation of the Gun-Free School Zones Act ("GFSZA"). 1°5 The
Supreme Court found that the GFSZA exceeded Congress's authority
under the Commerce Clause, reasoning that possession of a gun in a
school zone was not an economic activity substantially affecting
interstate commerce. 1 6 The Court held that Congress may regulate
three categories of activity under its Commerce Clause power: (1) the
use of channels of interstate commerce; (2) instrumentalities of
interstate commerce, including persons or things in interstate
commerce; and (3) activities substantially affecting interstate
commerce.0 7 The activity must be commercial in nature. 08
The Court also noted the importance of realizing limitations on
federal powers, especially in areas traditionally under state control. 10 9
The Court continued: "Thus, if we were to accept the Government's
arguments, we are hard pressed to posit any activity by an individual
that Congress is without power to regulate."" 0.
The government in Lopez argued that the "costs of crime" and the
effect on "national productivity" affected interstate commerce, giving
Congress the power to enact the legislation."' The Court rejected
those arguments, fearing that they would permit Congress to
"regulate not only all violent crime, but all activities that might lead to
violent crime, regardless of how tenuously they relate to interstate
103. Grant S. Nelson & Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Rethinking the Commerce Clause:
Applying First Principles to Uphold Federal Commercial Regulations but Preserve
State Control Over Social Issues, 85 Iowa L. Rev. 1, 83-84 (1999); John 0. McGinnis,
Reviving Tocqueville's America: The Rehnquist Court's Jurisprudence of Social
Discovery, 90 Cal. L. Rev. 485, 511-12 (2002); Paul Tzur, Comment, I Know
Economic Activity When I See Economic Activity: An Operational Overhaul of the
Measure By Which Federal Criminal Conduct Is Deemed "Economic," 94 J. Crim. L.
& Criminology 1105, 1105 (2004).
104. Andrew St. Laurent, Note, Reconstituting United States v. Lopez: Another
Look at Federal Criminal Law, 31 Colum. J.L. & Soc. Probs. 61, 61 (1997) (noting that
with Lopez, the Supreme Court established that "the powers of the Commerce Clause
may not be extended indefinitely and has reasserted its role as the final arbiter of the
limits of the Commerce Clause").
105. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551.
106. Id. at 567.
107. Id. at 558-59. "The required level of 'substantial affect' is hardly self-evident."
Richard W. Murphy, The Constitution As Political Structure, 13 Const. Comment. 330,
334 (1997) (book review); see Kerrie E. Maloney, Note, Gender-Motivated Violence
and the Commerce Clause: The Civil Rights Provision of the Violence Against Women
Act After Lopez, 96 Colum. L. Rev. 1876, 1917 (1996) (suggesting that the Court
looked for a "direct tie to commercial activity").
108. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561.
109. See id. at 564.
110. Id.
111. Id.
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commerce." 112  The Court went on to describe that under that
reasoning,
Congress could regulate any activity that it found was related
to the economic productivity of individual citizens: family
law ... for example. Under the[sel theories ... it is difficult to
perceive any limitation on federal power, even in areas such as
criminal law enforcement or education where States
historically have been sovereign.1 3
In rejecting the government's evidence and striking down the
GFSZA, the Supreme Court made clear that there must be a
"distinction between what is truly national and what is truly local."" 4
In United States v. Morrison,l"' the Supreme Court expanded
Lopez, further limiting Congress's powers under the Commerce
Clause. The Court determined that Congress violated its Commerce
Clause powers and Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment by
enacting the Violence Against Women Act" 6 ("VAWA").117  In
Morrison, the petitioner was a student at Virginia Polytechnic
Institute who reported being assaulted, raped, and sexually harassed
by the respondents.118 After the university's judicial committee failed
to punish either respondent, petitioner withdrew from the university
and filed suit." 9 Her complaint alleged, among other things, that the
attack violated VAWA. 120  Respondents moved to dismiss the
complaint, claiming that VAWA's civil remedy was
unconstitutional. 1
Addressing the constitutionality of VAWA, the Supreme Court
noted that "even under our modern, expansive interpretation of the
Commerce Clause, Congress's regulatory authority is not without
effective bounds., 12 2 The Court looked to its reasoning in Lopez,
noting that the Lopez decision "rested in part on the fact that the link
between gun possession and a substantial effect on interstate
commerce was attenuated.'1 23 The Court conceded that VAWA was
supported by numerous findings on the significant impact that gender-
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 567-68 (citing NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 30
(1937)).
115. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
116. 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (2000) (providing that "[alit persons within the United
States shall have the right to be free from crimes of violence motivated by gender"
and offering a federal civil remedy for victims of gender-motivated crimes).
117. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 619, 626-27.
118. Id. at 602.
119. Id. at 603-04.
120. Id. at 604.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 608 (citing United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 557 (1995)).
123. Id. at 612 (citing Lopez, 514 U.S. at 563-67).
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motivated violence has on its victims and their families. 24  It
reaffirmed that "[s]imply because Congress may conclude that a
particular activity substantially affects interstate commerce does not
necessarily make it so. '1125 The Court noted that the congressional
findings relied on an "unworkable" method of reasoning, defying the
Constitution's enumeration of powers. 12 6 Were the Court to accept
the petitioners' reasoning, Congress would have the power to regulate
any crime so long as its nationwide, collective impact had a substantial
effect on employment, production, transit, or consumption.127 The
Court feared that petitioners' reasoning would expand Congress's
power to regulate family law and other areas traditionally left to state
regulation. 128 It notes that while marriage, divorce, and childrearing
have a significant effect on the national economy, these are areas
traditionally under state control and outside the boundaries of
Congress's powers."' While Congress explicitly precluded VAWA
from being used in the family law context, the Supreme Court refused
to accept it as constitutional. 3° It declared that "[u]nder our written
Constitution... the limitation of congressional authority is not solely
a matter of legislative grace." '131
124. Id. at 614 (citing legislative findings). Congress found that violent, gender-
motivated crimes constitute bias crimes, violating victims' rights to be free from
gender discrimination. State and federal criminal laws do not adequately protect
against the bias element of gender-motivated crimes. See H.R. Rep. No. 103-711, at
385 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1803, 1853. Violent, gender-motivated
crimes "have a substantial adverse effect on interstate commerce, by deterring
potential victims from traveling interstate, from engaging in employment in interstate
business, and from transacting with business, and in places involved, in interstate
commerce." Id. These crimes "have a substantial adverse effect on interstate
commerce, by diminishing national productivity, increasing medical and other costs,
and decreasing the supply of and the demand for interstate products." Id. The report
found that a federal civil remedy is necessary to ensure equal protection and to
reduce the effects on interstate commerce caused by gender-motivated violent crimes.
Id. The Senate found that there is a need for a strong federal response to gender-
motivated crime, especially rape, noting that rape is a "repugnant crime" in which
victims are often further victimized by an insensitive criminal justice system and the
media. Id. at 386. The Senate described the need for rape victims to feel protected so
that they may come forward and bring the perpetrator to justice. Id.
125. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 614 (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557 n.2).
126. Id. at 615. The Court mentioned that these findings validate their concerns in
Lopez that Congress would use the Commerce Clause to eliminate the distinction
between federal and local power. Id.
127. Id. (worrying that if Congress had the power to regulate gender-motivated
violence, there would be a slippery slope leading to the power to regulate murder or
any other type of violence).
128. Id.
129. Id. at 615-16.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 616.
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2. Powers Afforded to Congress by Section Five of the Fourteenth
Amendment
Beyond the Commerce Clause, Section Five of the Fourteenth
Amendment gives Congress the power to legislate. Section Five states
that "Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation,
the provisions of this article.' 32 The original draft of the Fourteenth
Amendment gave Congress the "power to make all laws which shall
be necessary and proper to secure to the citizens of each State all
privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States, and to all
persons in the several States equal protection in the rights of life,
liberty, and property."'33 Before enactment, the framers worried that
the proposed amendment granted Congress the power to encroach in
areas traditionally governed by the states.3 4 They feared that the
amendment expanded Congress's power in a way that would
destabilize laws every time a party shift occurred in Congress.'35 The
"Fourteenth Amendment was never intended to restrict the authority
of the States to allocate their political power as they see fit."'1 3 6
Immediately following the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment,
two Supreme Court cases clarified its provisions. In United States v.
Harris,137 the Court considered a challenge to section two of the Civil
Rights Act of 1871, which punished "private persons" for "conspiring
to deprive any one of the equal protection of the laws enacted by the
State."' 38 The Court struck down the statute, finding that the law
exceeded Congress's Section Five power.139 It reasoned that the law
was "directed exclusively against the action of private persons,
without reference to the laws of the State or their administration by
her officers.' 140  The Court reaffirmed that the Fourteenth
Amendment provisions "have reference to state action exclusively,
and not to any action of private individuals., 14' Unless a state is guilty
132. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 5.
133. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997) (citing Cong. Globe, 39th
Cong., 1st Sess. 1034 (1866)).
134. Id. at 521 (noting that the fear existed among both Democrats and
conservative Republicans).
135. Id. at 520-21 (citing Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1034 (1866)). See
generally Marci A. Hamilton & David Schoenbrod, The Reaffirmation of
Proportionality Analysis Under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment, 21
Cardozo L. Rev. 469 (1999); K.G. Jan Pillai, Incongruent Disproportionality, 29
Hastings Const. L.Q. 645 (2002).
136. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 527 (citing Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 154
(1970) (opinion of Harlan, J.)).
137. 106 U.S. 629 (1882).
138. Id. at 639.
139. See id. at 637-40.
140. Id. at 640.
141. Id. at 639 (quoting Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313, 318 (1879)).
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of violating a Fourteenth Amendment provision, "the amendment
imposes no duty and confers no power upon Congress.
142
The Civil Rights Cases further interpreted Congress's powers under
the Fourteenth Amendment. 143  The Supreme Court declared that
"[i]ndividual invasion of individual rights is not the subject-matter of
the amendment."'"' Clarifying the Section Five provision, the Court
stated that Congress may enforce "the prohibition," meaning it may
legislate to correct the effects of such prohibited state actions,
rendering them null and void. 145 Section Five does not give Congress
the authority to legislate on issues within the realm of state powers
nor does it permit Congress to create laws regulating privacy rights.
146
It "provide[s a mode] of redress against the operation of State laws...
when these are subversive of the fundamental rights specified in the
amendment. 1' 47 Congress can only legislate in reaction to state action;
state laws or proceedings must precede any congressional
legislation.'
City of Boerne v. Flores149 is the most recent extensive Supreme
Court clarification of Congress's enforcement power under Section
Five of the Fourteenth Amendment. Before City of Boerne, the Court
considered the power to be "remedial," 5' entitling Congress to
enforce constitutional rights, but not change them.' As stated by the
Court: "There must be a congruence and proportionality between the
injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that
end. Lacking such a connection, legislation may become substantive
in operation and effect."'' 2  History and precedent support this
142. Id.
143. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
144. Id. at 11 (noting that the Amendment has a "deeper and broader scope").
The Court reaffirms that the Amendment nullifies and voids state legislation that
violates privileges and immunities, due process, or equal protection. Id.
145. Id. (stating that "[t]his is the legislative power conferred upon Congress, and
this is the whole of it").
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
150. Id. at 519 (quoting South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 326 (1966)).
151. Id.
152. Id. at 520. The Supreme Court has adhered to the congruence and
proportionality test; since City of Boerne, very little congressional enforcement
legislation has survived the test. See Bd. of Trustees of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett,
531 U.S. 356 (2001) (Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)); United States v.
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (Violence Against Women Act); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of
Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) (Age Discrimination in Employment Act); Coll. Savs.
Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999)
(Trademark Remedy Clarification Act); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense
Bd. v. Coll. Savs. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999) (Patent and Plant Variety Protection
Remedy Clarification Act); see also Pillai, supra note 135, at 646 n.5. But see Tenn. v.
Lane, 124 S. Ct. 1978 (2004) (upholding Title II of the ADA as a valid exercise of
Congress's enforcement power under the Fourteenth Amendment); Nev. Dept. of
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distinction.153 In City of Boerne, the Court found that the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA") of 1993 exceeded Congress's
Section Five powers. 154 It reasoned that the statute was overbroad,
and restricted, rather than enforced, a Fourteenth Amendment
provision. 15 5 The Court used extremely strong language in rejecting
the RFRA as unconstitutional, reasoning that the RFRA was "so out
of proportion to a supposed remedial or preventive object" that it
could not be deemed responsive to, or preventative of,
unconstitutional behavior. 56 The statute had "sweeping coverage,"
ensuring infringement at "every level of government, displacing laws
and prohibiting official actions of almost every description and
regardless of subject matter." '157  Its reach and scope were
overbroad.'58 City of Boerne mentions that the RFRA legislation has
no termination date, geographic restriction, or predicates. 5 9 The
Court noted that while these criteria are not mandatory, those sorts of
limitations tend to ensure that Congress's means are proportionate to
ends legitimate under Section Five. 6
The Court noted that the "RFRA is not designed to identify and
counteract state laws likely to be unconstitutional because of their
treatment of religion."'' Thus, Congress overstepped its boundaries
when enacting the legislation:
When the political branches of the Government act against the
background of a judicial interpretation of the Constitution already
issued, it must be understood that in later cases and controversies
the Court will treat its precedents with the respect due them under
settled principles, including stare decisis, and contrary expectations
must be disappointed.62
Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 740 (2003) (concluding that the Family Medical
Leave Act is "congruent and proportional to its remedial object, and can 'be
understood as responsive to, or designed to prevent, unconstitutional behavior"')
(quoting City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 532)).
153. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 520. But see Louis D. Bilionis, The New Scrutiny,
51 Emory L.J. 481, 526 (2002) (arguing that the Court has never uttered the phrase
"principles of proportion and congruence" before and it is "plucked seemingly from
thin air"). Bilionis argues that one might agree with the relevance of history and
precedent, without agreeing that judicial demands for proportionality and congruence
are necessary. Id.
154. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 511.
155. See id. at 532.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 532-33.
160. Id. at 533.
161. Id. at 534-35.
162. Id. at 536 (discussing that the RFRA was enacted to control cases and
controversies, but since it is beyond congressional authority, the Court's precedent
must control).
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Courts rely on City of Boerne to clarify the confines of
congressional powers under Section Five of the Fourteenth
Amendment. One example is Board of Trustees of University of
Alabama v. Garrett.63  There, the Court concluded that a federal
statute is not a valid exercise of Congress's Section Five powers when
the historical record and the statute's broad sweep suggest that the
statute's true aim is not enforcement, but an attempt to "rewrite" the
Court's Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence."6 The Court cited to
City of Boerne, confirming "the long-settled principle that it is the
responsibility of this Court, not Congress, to define the substance of
constitutional guarantees.' ' 165 Accordingly, Section Five legislation
must exhibit "congruence and proportionality between the injury to
be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end. '""6
While Congress determined that it was within its power to enact the
PBABA in 2003, "[s]imply because Congress may conclude that a
particular activity substantially effects interstate commerce does not
necessarily make it so. ''167 The limitations of the Commerce Clause,
along with Congress's power to enforce provisions of the Fourteenth
Amendment, raise serious doubts about whether Congress used its
powers appropriately when enacting the PBABA.
II. DO THE COMMERCE CLAUSE AND SECTION FIVE OF THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AFFORD CONGRESS POWER TO ENACT
THE PBABA?
Many physicians, politicians, and lobbyists have challenged the
PBABA since its enactment in 2003. Even while the bill was in
Congress, there was much debate over the constitutionality of its
enactment. 6 '
PBABA opponents argued that the PBABA was essentially the
same as the Nebraska statute that the Supreme Court struck down in
Stenberg169 Besides noting that no abortion ban without a health
163. 531 U.S. 356 (2001).
164. See id. at 372-74.
165. Id. at 365 (citing City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519-24).
166. Id. (quoting City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 520).
167. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 557 n.2 (1995) (quoting Hodel v. Va.
Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264,311 (1981)).
168. See 149 Cong. Rec. S13046-01,13046 (daily ed. Oct. 22, 2003) (statement of
Sen. Snowe) (stating that while she originally supported the PBABA, she withdrew
her support due to the lack of an exception for the life of the pregnant woman); 149
Cong. Rec. S12914-02,12917 (daily ed. Oct. 21, 2003) (statement of Sen. Boxer)
(worrying that the passage of the PBABA will send a message that women's health
does not matter). But see 149 Cong. Rec. S12914-02,12916 (daily ed. Oct. 21, 2003)
(statement of Sen. Santorum) (claiming that the PBABA is necessary to show the
world America's values and to protect children from brutality).
169. See Dawn E. Johnsen, Functional Departmentalism and Nonjudicial
Interpretation: Who Determines Constitutional Meaning?, 67 Law & Contemp. Probs.
105, 135 (2004).
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exception had ever been upheld, the challengers argued that the
congressional findings would not be enough to uphold the PBABA as
constitutional. 17' Nonetheless, both houses of Congress passed the
PBABA and President Bush signed the bill into law."' Shortly
thereafter, litigation ensued.
District courts have consistently invalidated the PBABA. Thus far,
three district courts have struck down the PBABA as
unconstitutional. In Planned Parenthood Federation of America v.
Ashcroft,172 the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
California found the PBABA unconstitutional based on three factors:
(1) the PBABA did not take into account the health of the pregnant
woman;1 73 (2) the PBABA was unconstitutionally vague because it did
not clearly define the banned procedures, depriving physicians of fair
notice, and leading to arbitrary enforcement; 74 and (3) the PBABA
placed an undue burden on a woman seeking an abortion of a
nonviable fetus.7 ' The plaintiffs also argued that the PBABA is
"impermissibly vague" as to what conduct is "in or affecting interstate
or foreign commerce," leading to the arbitrary and discriminatory
prosecution of physicians. 76 Once the court concluded that the
PBABA is unconstitutionally vague with regard to the abortion
procedures, it declined to address this argument.
77
A Nebraska district court found the PBABA unconstitutional in
Carhart v. Ashcroft17s based on four factors: (1) the PBABA did not
take into account the health of the pregnant woman;179 (2) since the
PBABA's language reached both D&X and D&E procedures, it
170. Gordon, supra note 14, at 508-09. Representative Jerrold Nadler (D-N.Y.)
found the idea that congressional findings in the PBABA would remove the need for
a health exception "laughable." Id. at 508. Representative John Conyers, Jr. (D-
Mich.) said that the authors of the PBABA believed that somehow "this bill is now
going to be okay because we have congressional findings." Id. at 508-09.
Representative Conyers noted that "Congress cannot simply refute findings of fact
made by the District Court by presenting its own 'findings' that are contrary to the
evidence the Court depended upon to make its ruling." Id. at 509.
171. Office of the Clerk, U.S. House of Representatives, Final Vote Results for
Roll Call 530, available at http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2003/rol530.xml (last visited Jan.
22, 2005); Senate Bill Clerk, U.S. Senate Roll Call Votes 104th Congress, 1st Session,
available at
http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll call-lists/roll_callvotecfm.cfm?congress=
108&session=l&vote=00402 (last visited Jan. 25, 2005).
172. 320 F. Supp. 2d 957 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
173. Id. at 978-1034 (discussing the PBABA's lack of a health exception).
174. Id. at 975-78.
175. Id. at 968-74. Some politicians denounced the ruling, supporting the PBABA
as constitutional. See 150 Cong. Rec. S6443-02,6444 (daily ed. June 3, 2004)
(statement of Sen. Brownback) (stating that the California decision "is wrong on the
medical facts, and it is wrong in its blatant disregard of Congressional findings").
176. Planned Parenthood Fed'n, 320 F. Supp. 2d at 975 n.15.
177. Id.
178. 331 F. Supp. 2d 805 (D. Neb. 2004).
179. Id. at 1004.
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constituted an undue burden on the woman seeking an abortion;"'° (3)
the PBABA was vague; 8' and (4) the PBABA applied to both pre-
and post-viable fetuses. 82 The plaintiffs alleged that certain terms,
such as "in or affecting interstate commerce," are unconstitutionally
vague. 3 Nonetheless, since the plaintiffs did not cite any binding
cases holding that such terms are constitutionally vague, the court
failed to address the issue in depth." Moreover, the court adopts a
"specific intent" approach to narrow the statute, obviating vagueness
concerns.
85
The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York in
National Abortion Federation v. Ashcroft declared the PBABA
unconstitutional, citing the same reasons as the Nebraska court and
the California court. 8 6 The court also noted that too much deference
was given to congressional findings. 187 At trial, the district court heard
more evidence than Congress had heard on the subject in eight
years. 88  Even the government experts disagreed with most of
Congress's factual findings.'89 The decision cites Turner Broadcasting
System, Inc. v. FCC90 ("Turner H").191 In Turner I, the Supreme
Court reviewed the constitutionality of the Cable Television
Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992 ("Cable
Television Act"), 92 which required "cable television systems to
dedicate some of their channels to local broadcast television
stations."'193 In Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC ("Turner I"),
the Court held that these "must-carry" provisions were content-
180. Id. at 1030.
181. Id. at 1037.
182. Id. at 1042.
183. Id. at 1040.
184. See id. at 1040-41.
185. Id.
186. Nat'l Abortion Fed'n v. Ashcroft, 330 F. Supp. 2d 436 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
187. Id. at 484 (noting that "such substantial deference to Congress's factfindings
would not comport with the Supreme Court's treatment of statutes burdening
fundamental rights, whether the constitutional test is 'the most exacting scrutiny'...
or undue burden" (internal citations omitted)).
188. Id. at 482 (finding that Congress "did not hold extensive hearings, nor did it
carefully consider the evidence before arriving at its findings"). Congress held two
hearings after the Stenberg decision, lasting three hours. Id. Three physicians
testified, and one of them had already testified before Congress regarding the
PBABA. Id. Only seven physicians testified about the safety of the D&X procedure,
and their testimony lasted fewer hours than that which the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York heard. Id.
189. Id.
190. 520 U.S. 180 (1997).
191. Nat'l Abortion Fed'n, 330 F. Supp. 2d at 483 (discussing Turner I and Turner H
and the level of deference owed to congressional findings).
192. Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L.
No. 102-385, 106 Stat. 1460 (1992) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 47 §
U.S.C.).
193. Turner 1H, 520 U.S. at 185.
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neutral, incidental restrictions on speech, requiring intermediate
scrutiny.194
The court in National Abortion Federation noted that the standard
for deferring to Congress should be more lax in dealing with the
PBABA because the court is dealing with a fundamental right, rather
than only a mid-level review situation. 95 The court did not address
whether Congress had the power to enact the PBABA, because the
plaintiffs did not allege that Congress exceeded its authority under the
Commerce Clause and Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment
when it passed the PBABA.1 96 PBABA advocates deplored these
decisions, declaring them a demonstration of judicial activism.197
While these courts cite the Stenberg decision, noting the similarities
in language between the Nebraska statute and the PBABA, there is
another issue that deserves attention. A question still remains as to
whether Congress possesses the power to enact such legislation, which
the courts did not address. 198 Congress derives many of its powers
from the Commerce Clause and Section Five of the Fourteenth
Amendment.' 99 While Congress attempted to structure the PBABA
to ensure that the Supreme Court would afford great deference to the
legislative findings, the Supreme Court may not need to defer so
194. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 662 (1994).
195. Nat'l Abortion Fed'n, 330 F. Supp. 2d at 484; see also Richard A. Brisbin, Jr. &
Edward V. Heck, The Battle Over Strict Scrutiny: Coalitional Conflict in the
Rehnquist Court, 32 Santa Clara L. Rev. 1049, 1099 (1992) (noting that in Hodgson v.
Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 463 (1990), the Rehnquist Court in 1990 abortion cases
"explicitly reiterated the position that Roe v. Wade was still controlling and that laws
limiting the fundamental right to choose abortion should be subjected to the 'most
exacting scrutiny' of the compelling interest standard"). Finding Turner II at odds
with Stenberg, the district court ignored the Turner II standard when giving deference
to congressional findings. See Nat'l Abortion Fed'n, 330 F. Supp. 2d at 484-86 (noting
that even when strict scrutiny did not apply, the Court was not "so deferential to
congressional factfinding in other cases" determining the constitutionality of
congressional statutes (citing United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000)).
196. Nat'l Abortion Fed'n, 330 F. Supp. 2d at 439 n.1. It is unclear why the
plaintiffs focused on due process issues rather than congressional powers when
challenging the PBABA. It could be that the arguments against the PBABA based
on due process are stronger. Another possibility could be that normally these liberal
groups encourage federal legislation and might not want to restrict these federal
powers (they might not want to curtail federal funding possibilities for abortion
procedures).
197. See, e.g., 150 Cong. Rec. S6443-02,6444 (daily ed. June 3, 2004) (statement of
Sen. Brownback) (claiming that the California district court decision striking down
the PBABA is "judicial bias and judicial activism at its extreme"); 150 Cong. Rec.
H2239-15 (daily ed. Apr. 21, 2004) (statement of Rep. King) (claiming that no
congressional legislation would meet the sort of standard that would "allow a single
judge to substitute his judgment for the wisdom of the people of America.... If we
allow judicial activism to run its course, there is no point in this body existing. They
will have taken away all of the legislative power of this Congress").
198. See supra notes 176-77, 183-85, 196 and accompanying text (discussing the lack
of attention the district courts gave to issues of congressional powers when striking
down the PBABA).
199. See supra Parts I.D.1-l.D.2.
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strongly to the congressional findings. Moreover, while Section Five
of the Fourteenth Amendment gives Congress the power to enforce
provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, it does not grant Congress
the authority to restrict constitutional rights.
A. The Commerce Clause and the PBABA
While the PBABA claims to regulate partial-birth abortions "in or
affecting interstate commerce," its extensive "Findings" section does
not mention interstate commerce."' 0 Only the accompanying House
Report attempts to invoke the Commerce Clause by mentioning that
most abortion providers likely advertise and purchase medical
supplies across state lines, and many women seek abortions out of
state; thus the procedures affect interstate commerce. 0 1  Under
Lopez, however, it is the Supreme Court, not Congress, who must
determine whether partial-birth abortions substantially affect
interstate commerce. 2
In Lopez, the Supreme Court outlined the boundaries of Congress's
Commerce Clause powers. Congress may regulate three categories of
commercial activity pursuant to its commerce power: (1) the use of
channels of interstate commerce; (2) instrumentalities of interstate
commerce, including persons or things in interstate commerce; and (3)
activities substantially affecting interstate commerce.2 3 "[W]hether
particular operations affect interstate commerce sufficiently to come
under the constitutional power of Congress to regulate them is
ultimately a judicial rather than a legislative question, and can be
settled finally only by this Court. 
''21
The Court applied this analysis in Morrison,215 striking down
VAWA.0 6 There are many parallels between VAWA and the
PBABA. Both domestic violence and abortion procedures involve
physical interaction between people. The PBABA focuses on partial-
birth abortion procedures as "gruesome and inhumane" acts of
violence; it does not punish the doctor for the service he provides, but
for the violent act of killing a fetus, a noneconomic activity. 207
200. The Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-105, § 2, 117 Stat.
1201 (2003) (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1531).
201. The Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, H.R. Rep. No. 108-58, at 24-25
(2003).
202. See infra note 204 and accompanying text.
203. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558-59 (1995).
204. Id. at 557 n.2 (citing Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S.
241, 273 (1964) (Black, J., concurring)).
205. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
206. 42 U.S.C. § 13981(b)-(c) (2000) (providing that "[a]ll persons within the
United States shall have the right to be free from crimes of violence motivated by
gender" and offering a federal civil remedy for victims of gender-motivated crimes).
207. See The Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-105, § 2(1),
117 Stat. 1201 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1531); Allan Ides, The Partial-Birth
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Some commentators argue that since abortion clinics charge a fee
for services and doctors perform abortion services for payment,
abortions are commercial in nature.20 8 Moreover, sometimes abortion
clinics buy supplies from out-of-state and deal with out-of-state
insurance companies.2 °9 Patients may travel interstate seeking a
partial-birth abortion.21" Thus, these commentators argue that
abortions could be construed to substantially affect interstate
commerce. 211
Opponents of the PBABA argue that while abortion clinics might
be commercial enterprises, a physician's choice to perform a specific
type of abortion is not related to commerce,212 as implicitly stated in
the PBABA's findings.213 While the PBABA begins by stating that
"[a]ny physician who, in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce,
knowingly performs a partial-birth abortion 214 it is practically
impossible to perform an abortion "in or affecting interstate or
foreign commerce. "215 Additionally, since Lopez supports limiting
federal powers in areas where states historically have exerted
authority,216 and crime, family law, and medical regulation are all
issues traditionally under state control, the PBABA should not
survive Commerce Clause review. 217
B. District Courts' Deference to Congressional Findings
Congress specifically shaped the PBABA to endorse the deference
standard it hoped the district courts would employ when analyzing the
Abortion Ban Act of 2003 and the Commerce Clause, 20 Const. Comment. 441, 447
(2003-2004).
208. See David B. Kopel & Glenn H. Reynolds, Taking Federalism Seriously:
Lopez and the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act, 30 Conn. L. Rev. 59, 104-05 (1997)
(explaining how a court could uphold a partial-birth abortion ban).
209. See id.
210. See id.
211. See id.
212. Id. at 105 (describing what a decision striking a federal partial-birth abortion
might mention).
213. See The Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-105, § 2(1)-
(14), 117 Stat. 1201 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1531).
214. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1531(a) (West Supp. 2004).
215. See Kopel & Reynolds, supra note 208, at 111 (stating that the only possible
way a physician could perform an abortion "in or affecting interstate or foreign
commerce" is by "operating a mobile abortion clinic on the Metroliner"); Sylvia A.
Law, In the Name of Federalism: The Supreme Court's Assault on Democracy and
Civil Rights, 70 U. Cin. L. Rev. 367, 410-11 (2002) (deeming it "difficult to imagine
how a federal criminal prohibition on particular methods of abortion" complies with
Lopez); see also supra note 204 and accompanying text (noting that just because
Congress claims that an activity affects interstate commerce does not necessarily
make it so).
216. See supra notes 109-10 and accompanying text.
217. See Ides, supra note 207, at 454 (citing Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 237
(2000) (noting that "the field of health care [is] a subject of traditional state
regulation"); Kopel & Reynolds, supra note 208, at 71 n.56, 105.
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legislation. Congress cited four cases in the PBABA's "Findings"
section to substantiate the standard it wanted used in reviewing its
legislation:28 Anderson v. Bessemer City,2 9 Katzenbach v. Morgan,20
Turner I, and Turner H. However, these cases do not necessarily
support Congress's hopes for substantial deference to its findings.
The Supreme Court in Anderson found that a court must accept a
lower court's findings of fact unless it has a "firm conviction" that they
are "clearly erroneous., 221 Congress sought to show that while the
Supreme Court was bound to accept the trial court's factual findings,
Congress may reach its own factual findings.2
To ensure that courts provided deference to its findings under the
PBABA, Congress cited Katzenbach.23  The Supreme Court in
Katzenbach allowed congressional findings that sought to expand the
fundamental right to vote to more citizens.224 Katzenbach gave great
deference to Congress's findings, reasoning that "[iut was for
Congress, as the branch that made this judgment, to assess and weigh
the various conflicting considerations .... It is enough that we be
able to perceive a basis upon which the Congress might resolve the
conflict as it did. '225 Relying on this language, Congress reached its
own factual findings, and thereafter enacted the PBABA based on
these findings.226  As long as the legislation pursues a legitimate
constitutional interest, and "draws reasonable inferences based upon
substantial evidence," Congress has the power to enact legislation
based on findings to be given great deference by the Supreme
Court.227
While Congress relied on Katzenbach to establish its findings, the
statute at issue in Katzenbach sharply differs from the PBABA.
Katzenbach sought to expand a fundamental right, yet the PBABA
seeks to limit a fundamental right.228 Moreover, "when a law denies
(rather than expands) a fundamental right, that law is subject to the
strictest scrutiny. ' 229 Thus, since the right to an abortion constitutes a
218. See § 2, 117 Stat. at 1201.
219. 470 U.S. 564 (1985).
220. 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
221. Anderson, 470 U.S. at 573 (quoting United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333
U.S. 364, 395 (1948)).
222. § 2(8), 117 Stat. at 1201.
223. 384 U.S. at 641.
224. Id. at 646-47.
225. Id. at 653.
226. See § 2(8), 117 Stat. at 1201.
227. Id.
228. See Melissa C. Holsinger, The Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003: The
Congressional Reaction to Stenberg v. Carhart, 6 N.Y.U. J. Legis. & Pub. Pol'y 603,
611 (2003) (stating that the statute in question in Katzenbach was an attempt by
Congress to enforce a constitutional right whereas the PBABA is a congressional
effort to limit a constitutional right expressed by the Supreme Court).
229. Kushnir, supra note 14, at 1179 (citing Katzenbach, 384 U.S. at 657).
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fundamental right, the Court need not defer to Congress in quite the
same way when analyzing the PBABA.23 °  When the Court
legitimately classifies an activity, "the regulation of which ought to
trigger suspicions, those suspicions should apply to fact-finding as
well., 231' Then, the Court need not be very deferential to Congress
when legislating in a context meriting heightened scrutiny. 32
Congress also relied on the Turner cases to ensure the application
of a highly deferential standard to their findings. In the Turner cases,
the Court applied a highly deferential standard to the findings of
Congress regarding the continuity of local broadcast television. 33
Turner II lays out a roadmap by which the courts may defer to
Congress's findings. 234 First, the court reviews the harm or risk that
induced Congress's action: "[C]ourts must accord substantial
deference to the predictive judgments of Congress" when reviewing a
statute's constitutionality.2 135 Then, the courts' only obligation is to
guarantee that "in formulating its judgments, Congress has drawn
reasonable inferences based on substantial evidence. 23 6  Courts
measure substantiality by "a standard more deferential than...
accord[ed] to judgments of an administrative agency. "237 The
Supreme Court reasoned that Congress "is far better equipped than
the judiciary to 'amass and evaluate the vast amounts of data' bearing
upon" legislative issues.23' By drawing on inferences that partial-birth
abortion procedures are "gruesome," Congress used its findings to
230. See Holsinger, supra note 228, at 611-12. An argument exists that the
Supreme Court should give more deference to Congress and that the Court is too
lenient in extending "heightened scrutiny" to areas like Section Five of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Vikram David Amar, How Much Protection Do Injunctions
Against Enforcement of Allegedly Unconstitutional Statutes Provide?, 31 Fordham
Urb. L.J. 657, 660 n.17 (2004) (noting that from 1995-2000, Congress struck down
twenty-four congressional enactments compared with the relatively low number from
the earlier days of the century).
231. Amar, supra note 230, at 660.
232. Id.; see supra note 25.
233. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 195 (1997); Turner Broad.
Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 665-67 (1994).
234. See Turner, 520 U.S. at 195-96.
235. Id. at 195 (quoting Turner, 512 U.S. at 665).
236. Id. (quoting Turner, 512 U.S. at 666).
237. Id. (citing Turner, 512 U.S. at 666-67); see, e.g., Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v.
Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984) (deferring to agency's
interpretation of vague statutes if the agency's interpretation is reasonable); Motor
Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42-43 (1983)
(expressing a highly deferential standard for reviewing agency rulemaking); Fid. Fed.
Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. De la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153-54 (1982) (noting that the
courts' inquiries into administrative agencies and Congress are similar when
preempting state law).
238. Turner, 520 U.S. at 195 (citing Turner, 512 U.S. at 665-66 (quoting Walters v.
Nat'l Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 331 n.12 (1985)); see Ward v. Rock
Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 800 (1989); Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 83 (1981)
(finding that courts must perform an "appropriately deferential examination of
Congress' evaluation of [the] evidence").
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enact the PBABA, expecting that the Supreme Court will afford its
findings great deference under the Turner cases.239
A court could distinguish the PBABA from the Turner statutes. 2 40
In Turner II, the Court used a mid-level standard of review.2 41 The
PBABA involves the right to abort a pre-viable fetus, which is a
fundamental right, subject to heightened scrutiny.242 Moreover,
Congress enacted the PBABA in response to the Stenberg decision,
while Congress did not implement the Cable Television Act in
response to a Supreme Court decision.243 The factual findings in the
Cable Television Act relate to "predictive judgments," involving
''complex regulatory schemes and the interaction of industries
undergoing significant economic and technological changes."' 244 This
is in contrast to the PBABA, which neither relates to a complex
regulatory scheme nor to an industry enduring significant change.245
Therefore, under this reasoning, the level of deference given to
Congress when evaluating the PBABA need not be so substantial.
Congress used the PBABA to express disagreement with how the
Supreme Court exercised its power in Stenberg.246 While Turner
advises courts on giving deference to congressional findings, Turner
and Stenberg are distinguishable. In Stenberg, the Supreme Court
"implicitly rejected deference to the institutional competency of
legislatures, at least when abortion regulations are concerned. '247 The
Supreme Court set a standard by which the government cannot
"legislate in the face of medical uncertainty." 248 Therefore, the Court
should remain consistent and refrain from offering the deference it
rejected in Stenberg when evaluating whether Congress's findings
were correct to determine that the PBABA satisfied the Stenberg
standard.249
239. See The Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-105, § 2(11)-
(14), 117 Stat. 1201 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1531) (concluding that since
Congress found no evidence that a partial-birth abortion is medically necessary, it
need not include a health exception). After laying out the Turner deference
standards, Congress goes through its findings that partial-birth abortion is never
medically necessary and "blurs the line between abortion and infanticide." Id. §
2(14)(O).
240. See Nat'l Abortion Fed'n v. Ashcroft, 330 F. Supp. 2d 436 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)
(striking down the PBABA using a different deference standard than Turner).
241. Turner, 520 U.S. at 189.
242. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 933
(1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153-54 (1973); supra
note 25.
243. Holsinger, supra note 228, at 612.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Nat'l Abortion Fed'n v. Ashcroft, 330 F. Supp. 2d 436, 486 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
247. Id.
248. Id. (citing Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 937-38 (2000)).
249. Id.
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C. Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment and the PBABA
Section Five grants Congress the authority to "enforce" the
provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment.25° Congress may not
legislate against private individuals; it may only enact legislation in
response to state laws.251 Under City of Boerne, Section Five does not
empower Congress to restrict constitutional rights; Section Five is
strictly limited to the enforcement of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Congress's power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment is
"remedial," not "substantive. '252  Congress cannot enforce a
constitutional interpretation that differs from "the interpretation that
the Court itself would adopt., 253  Some scholars argue that courts
should give Congress leeway, and that the Supreme Court should not
supervise Congress's actions under Section Five. 54  Because
Congressmen are elected by a democratic process, there is a certain
legitimacy to their actions that does not exist in the court system.2 5
Moreover, proponents of giving Congress flexibility rely on Justice
Brennan's opinion in Katzenbach,256 which indicated that "Congress
might find a violation of the Equal Protection Clause even where the
Court has not." 257 Congress may be better equipped than the courts
in finding constitutional violations because of its resources and
confidence. It might enact "complex and preventive remedies"
more elaborate than an action a court would take.259
The Court gave Congress the power to act prophylactically:
Congress may ban permissible state conduct to prevent or remedy
constitutional violations. 260 Nonetheless, the Court must "distinguish
between prophylactic legislation and legislation that seeks to change
the substantive meaning of the Constitution., 261  Thus, if Congress
250. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 5.
251. See supra notes 145-48 and accompanying text.
252. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997).
253. Ernest A. Young, Is the Sky Falling on the Federal Government? State
Sovereign Immunity, the Section Five Power, and the Federal Balance, 81 Tex. L. Rev.
1551, 1570 (2003) (reviewing John T. Noonan, Jr., Narrowing the Nation's Power:
The Supreme Court Sides with the States (2002)).
254. See id. at 1572 (describing Judge Noonan's argument that Congress should
have interpretive freedom so that when people differ about the meaning of the
Constitution, Congress can act on its own meaning).
255. See Ernest A. Young, The Rehnquist Court's Two Federalisms, 83 Tex. L. Rev.
1, 68 (2004).
256. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 648-58 (1966).
257. Young, supra note 253, at 1573 (noting that the "substantive power"
interpretation of Katzenbach is controversial).
258. Id. (citing Archibald Cox, Foreword: Constitutional Adjudication and the
Promotion of Human Rights, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 91,106-08 (1966)).
259. Id. at 1575.
260. Id. at 1577.
261. Id.
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acts prophylactically, the legislation must have "'congruence and
proportionality' to the constitutional violation at issue.21
62
In Morrison, once the Court determined that the Commerce Clause
did not afford Congress the power to enact VAWA, it analyzed
Congress's power under Section Five of the Fourteenth
Amendment.263 Distinguishing VAWA from other federal statutes
challenged under Section Five,2" the Court found that VAWA was
not a "remedy ... directed to the culpable state official., 261 While
VAWA applied uniformly throughout the United States, Congress's
findings indicated that the discrimination problem associated with
gender-motivated crimes did not exist in most states.266 Therefore, the
Supreme Court found that under Section Five of the Fourteenth
Amendment, Congress did not have the authority to enact VAWA.267
The Morrison analysis can apply to the PBABA. Like VAWA, the
PBABA is not directed to a culpable state official. It applies
uniformly throughout the country, yet the partial-birth abortion
"problem" does not exist in every state; to the contrary, many states
already have partial-birth abortion bans in place.268
Some scholars, such as Judge Noonan, criticize the Morrison
decision, arguing that "Congress should be able to provide remedies
against private defendants as a remedy for unconstitutional state
action.""269 This view finds the states' failure to prosecute gender-
motivated crimes as unconstitutional, not the crime itself.270 Such
criticism could apply to the PBABA as well, since some states do not
prosecute physicians for performing partial-birth abortions. However,
the Supreme Court in Morrison found this argument contrary to
precedent.2 7
1
262. Id. at 1570 (quoting City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997)).
263. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 619 (2000) (noting that Congress
explicitly included the Fourteenth Amendment as a source of authority to enact
VAWA).
264. See id. at 624-27 (citing The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883); United
States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629 (1882); Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1880);
Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966)).
265. Id. at 626.
266. Id. at 626-27. The Court noted that in Katzenbach, Congress directed the
remedy only to the State where Congress found wrongdoing and in South Carolina v.
Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966), Congress targeted the remedy only to the states in
which Congress determined the existence of discrimination. Morrison, 529 U.S. at
626-27.
267. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 627.
268. Congress was not responding to any unconstitutional state laws by enacting
the PBABA; to the contrary many states have enacted their own partial-birth
abortion bans. See, e.g., Ga. Code Ann. § 16-12-144 (1997); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §
14:32.9 (West 1997); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 333.17016 (West 2001); Tenn. Code
Ann. § 39-15-209 (1997).
269. Young, supra note 253, at 1581-82.
270. Id. at 1582.
271. See id. (discussing the Civil Rights Cases, in which the Court struck down a
provision which sanctioned conduct). Because states had equality laws that were
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PBABA supporters assert that Section Five allows Congress to
protect potential life.2 12 Considering a legislative ban on partial-birth
abortions constitutional, Attorney General John Ashcroft stated that
"allowing this life-taking procedure to continue would be inconsistent
with our obligation under section 5 of the 14th Amendment to protect
life. 273 The Fourteenth Amendment, however, refers to "persons,"
which does not include the unborn.274 While some argue that the
government has the right to protect creatures besides persons, the
government does not have the power to do this "in ways that make
the exercise of a fundamental constitutional right impossible.
275
While Congress purports that the Commerce Clause and Section
Five of the Fourteenth Amendment afford it the power to enact the
PBABA, previous case law does not grant Congress such authority.
In analyzing the constitutionality of the PBABA, the Supreme Court
has the opportunity to clarify the boundaries of congressional powers
with regard to partial-birth abortions.
III. KEEPING THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AWAY FROM ABORTION
LEGISLATION SUCH AS THE PBABA
In complying with the historic checks and balances system, the
Supreme Court should review the PBABA to determine if Congress
overstepped its boundaries by enacting the statute. The Court must
neutrally use the preexisting law to examine the constitutionality of
the PBABA, without allowing personal prejudices to influence the
decision.276 Ultimately it will be up to the Court to either strike down
unenforced by the state governments, Congress wished to give an alternate remedy
under federal law, yet it was prohibited from doing so under Section Five of the
Fourteenth Amendment. See id.
272. See Law, supra note 215, at 411.
273. Id. at 411 n.271 (citing 114 Cong. Rec. S10,491 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 1998)).
274. See id. at 412 n.277. "[T]he word 'person,' as used in the Fourteenth
Amendment, does not include the unborn." Id. (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 156, 158
(1973)). Moreover, "an abortion is not 'the termination of life entitled to Fourteenth
Amendment protection."' Id. (citing Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 913 (1992)). But see Unborn Victims of Violence Act, 18
U.S.C.A. § 1841 (West Supp. 2004) (providing that "[w]hoever engages in conduct
that ... causes the death of, or bodily injury... to, a child, who is in utero at the time
the conduct takes place, is guilty of a separate offense"). The Unborn Victims of
Violence Act, however, explicitly notes that the statute is not applicable to "any
conduct relating to an abortion". Id. § 1841(c)(1); see also 26 GOP Members of
Congress Ask Federal Appeals Court to Overturn Ruling Striking Down Federal
Abortion Ban, Daily Reprod. Health Rep. (The Henry J. Kaiser Family Found.,
Menlo Park, Ca.), Dec. 10, 2004, available at
http://www.kaisernetwork.org/daily-reports/rep-index.cfm?hint=2&DR ID=27177.
275. Dworkin, supra note 40, at 114 (citing the arguments of Professor John Hart
Ely of Stanford Law School and Professor Laurence Tribe of Harvard Law School).
276. See Roger Clegg, Is a Ban on Partial-Birth Abortions Within Congress's
Enumerated Powers?, Fall Nexus, 1998, at 25 (acknowledging that "[flor a
conservative, it does not follow that, just because something is wrong, Congress has
authority to prohibit it... even if something is very wrong"); Ronald J. Krotoszynski,
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or uphold the PBABA, setting the future for the expansion or
tightening of Congress's powers.
Congress did not have the requisite power to enact the PBABA;
thus, it is unconstitutional. Upholding the PBABA would not only
undermine Roe and Casey, it would undermine the Commerce Clause
and Section Five jurisprudence. The Commerce Clause would retreat
back to the pre-Lopez standard, with few limitations on Congress. 77
Congress's power to "enforce" under Section Five would stretch to
include congressional actions already deemed unconstitutional by the
Supreme Court; Congress would no longer need to show congruence
and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied
and the means adopted to that end.278 Moreover, when striking down
the PBABA, besides focusing on the precedent set by Stenberg, the
statute's lack of a health exception for the pregnant woman, its
vagueness, and the undue burden it places on the pregnant woman,
the Court should make explicitly clear that Congress does not have
the authority to enact such legislation over partial-birth abortions.
Partial-birth abortion regulation should remain solely within the
states' domain.
Part III.A argues that Congress did not possess power under the
Commerce Clause to enact the PBABA. Part III.B proposes that the
Court need not afford substantial deference to Congress's findings
that the PBABA is a valid expression of congressional powers. Part
III.C argues that Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment did not
afford Congress the requisite authority to enact the PBABA. Part
III.D illustrates the implications of a decision upholding the
constitutionality of the PBAL3A.
A. The PBABA's Unconstitutionality Under the Commerce Clause
The PBABA can be struck down as a violation of congressional
powers under the Commerce Clause. First, both crime and health
care are traditionally areas of state control 7.2 9 Even before Lopez, the
Court accentuated criminal law as a state concern. 8° Moreover,
Jr., Listening to the "Sounds of Sovereignty" but Missing the Beat. Does the New
Federalism Really Matter?, 32 Ind. L. Rev. 11, 24 (1998) (worrying that the Supreme
Court would not apply "neutral federalism principles" when reviewing a federal law
prohibiting or severely discouraging specific abortion procedures because personal
views on abortion would get in the way).
277. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
278. See supra notes 154-67, 265-68 and accompanying text (discussing the standard
set by the Supreme Court in City of Boerne for reviewing statutes under Section Five
and cases that applied the congruence and proportionality analysis).
279. See Ides, supra note 207, at 454 (citing Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 237
(2000) (noting that "the field of health care [is] a subject of traditional state
regulation)); Kopel & Reynolds, supra note 208, at 71 n.56.
280. Kopel & Reynolds, supra note 208, at 71 n.56 (citing Brecht v. Abrahamson,
507 U.S. 619, 635 (1993); United States v. Emmons, 410 U.S. 396, 411-12 (1973);
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medical regulation and family law are both traditionally matters left to
the states.281 Thus, the PBABA limits a "truly local" activity, which is
unconstitutional under Lopez.282 The PBABA is the first federal law
outlawing a form of abortion since Roe.283 It is also the first legislation
criminalizing a medical procedure. 2 4 To uphold the PBABA would
be to expand federal powers to other aspects of medical procedures
and family law, which is precisely what Lopez sought to avoid.285
When Congress enacted VAWA, it added a clause stating that the
statute would not encroach in the state-controlled area of family
law.286 Nonetheless, the Court still struck down the statute, finding
that the statute infringed on an area of law traditionally left up to the
states.287 While Congress might feel that the PBABA fails to invade
the state-controlled realm of family law, the Court will conduct its
own analysis as to whether the statute primarily deals with a federal
issue. Because the PBABA deals with abortion, a family law matter,
the Court should not be sympathetic to an argument that Congress did
not mean to invade traditional state-controlled areas of law. There is
no need for Congress to impose itself in this manner as states are
competent to regulate partial-birth abortions.288
Second, the Court must determine whether the restricted partial-
birth abortion procedures are economic in nature.289 In Lopez, the
Supreme Court struck down the GFSZA because the regulated
activity (gun possession) was not economic in nature.29 ' Like gun
possession, partial-birth abortions can occur in a noncommercial
setting.291 Although most doctors will only perform abortions for a
Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945) (reaffirming criminal law as an issue for
the states rather than the federal government)).
281. Kopel & Reynolds, supra note 208, at 105.
282. See supra note 114 and accompanying text; see also Law, supra note 215, at 412
(noting that a law criminalizing abortion "falls under the domain of the 'truly local'
because it involves both criminal and family law").
283. 150 Cong. Rec. S4371-01 (daily ed. Apr. 26, 2004) (statement of Sen.
Feinstein).
284. Id.
285. See Kopel & Reynolds, supra note 208, at 105; see also supra notes 110-14 and
accompanying text.
286. See supra notes 129-30 and accompanying text.
287. See supra notes 127-31 and accompanying text.
288. See Kopel & Reynolds, supra note 208, at 110 (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113, 163-64 (1973)).
289. See supra notes 105-14 and accompanying text (discussing the Lopez standard
for the Commerce Clause).
290. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567 (1995); see also Ides, supra note 207,
at 446 (noting that while the defendant in Lopez wished to sell his gun, the Court
deemed his conduct noneconomic since the application of the GFSZA did not require
any such showing); supra notes 101-14 and accompanying text (discussing the
significance of the Lopez decision).
291. Ides, supra note 207, at 446 (noting that "[i]f simple gun possession is
noneconomic, then the performance of an abortion, unadorned by a commercial
element, must be similarly characterized").
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fee, the PBABA does not require that the woman obtain an abortion
in a commercial transaction. 92
Third, the Court must analyze whether the restricted partial-birth
abortion procedures substantially affect interstate commerce.293 The
arguments that partial-birth abortions substantially affect interstate
commerce because abortion clinics charge a fee for services, doctors
perform abortion services for payment, and abortion clinics buy
supplies from out-of-state and deal with out-of-state insurance
companies, are incompatible with the Lopez decision and other case
law. the effects of partial-birth abortions on interstate commerce are
tenuous, at most.
294
Fourth, while the PBABA begins by stating that "[a]ny physician
who, in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce, knowingly
performs a partial-birth abortion '295 it is practically impossible to
perform an abortion "in or affecting interstate or foreign
commerce." 296  Also, this phrase contradicts Lopez and Morrison,
which distinguish between "the nature of the regulated activity and its
potential effect on interstate commerce. ' '297 To consider any activity
which affects interstate commerce economic would be to obliterate
the distinction between an economic and a noneconomic activity. 98
The PBABA does not limit the ban to abortions performed for
payment, including noncommercial and commercial abortions.
Therefore, the overbroad quality of the PBABA bans a noneconomic
procedure that does not substantially affect interstate commerce.
Accordingly, the PBABA violates the Commerce Clause as clarified
by Lopez.
While the PBABA's accompanying House Report declares that the
partial-birth abortion procedures affect interstate commerce, 299 the
292. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1531 (West Supp. 2004); Ides, supra note 207, at 446
(claiming partial-birth abortion procedures are not part of a commercial transaction,
much like acts of domestic violence punished by VAWA). While the PBABA uses
the words "in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce," that is not enough. Id. at
449 (noting that the PBABA does not contain language limiting the scope of the
"affecting interstate commerce" and thus embraces commercial and noncommercial
activities that affect interstate commerce).
293. See supra notes 105-14 and accompanying text (discussing the Lopez standard
for the Commerce Clause).
294. See supra notes 201-04, 212-17 and accompanying text.
295. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1531.
296. Kopel & Reynolds, supra note 208, at 111 (stating that the only possible way a
physician could perform an abortion "in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce"
is by "operating a mobile abortion clinic on the Metroliner"); see also supra note 204
and accompanying text (noting that just because Congress claims that an activity
affects interstate commerce does not necessarily make it so).
297. See Ides, supra note 207, at 449.
298. See id. at 450 (noting that the "in or affecting interstate commerce" language
does not limit the PBABA's scope to abortions-for-hire).
299. The Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, H.R. Rep. No. 108-58, at 24-25
(2003).
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PBABA's banned procedure accounts for only 0.17 percent of all
abortions, often when the fetus could not sustain life outside the
womb.3 °° This does not constitute a substantial effect on interstate
commerce." 1 Congress could not rationally conclude that women who
travel interstate to obtain a partial-birth abortion have a significant
impact on interstate commerce.0"
B. Why the Court Need Not Give Substantial Deference to Congress's
Findings Under the PBABA
The Court made it clear in Lopez that just because Congress
concludes that an activity substantially affects interstate commerce
does not make it true.30 3 As the Court stated, "[t]his case deals with
factual findings rather than legal interpretation; however, it would
also infringe upon the constitutional role of the judiciary if Congress
could simply tell the federal courts that their findings are wrong and
receive substantial deference in order to prove it."3" The Court also
noted that "[u]nlike the statute in Turner, in which Congress exercised
original, predictive judgment about the marketplace, but similarly to
the RFRA, the Act here is an expression of Congress's disagreement
with how the judiciary has exercised its authority.""3 5 While Turner
advises courts on giving deference to congressional findings, Turner
and Stenberg are distinguishable. In Stenberg, the Supreme Court
"implicitly rejected deference to the institutional competency of
legislatures, at least when abortion regulations are concerned. 3 6 The
Supreme Court set a standard by which the government cannot
"legislate in the face of medical uncertainty. '"3 7 In the Stenberg
dissent, Justices Thomas and Kennedy acknowledged that "barring
legislative action when there is no consensus on an abortion
procedure disregards the Court's traditional respect for legislatures'
superior resources and factfinding capabilities. 3 8  The Supreme
300. Kushnir, supra note 14, at 1177.
301. The Court will uphold "regulations of activities that arise out of or are
connected with a commercial transaction, which viewed in the aggregate, substantially
affects interstate commerce." Maloney, supra note 107, at 1917 (quoting United
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995)); see supra note 107 and accompanying text.
302. Kopel & Reynolds, supra note 208, at 105; see Clegg, supra note 276, at 31
(explaining that Congress is "not trying to ban partial-birth abortions as a means of
regulating interstate commerce, after all. They are banning them because they
believe persons are being murdered and they want it to stop").
303. See supra notes 105-14 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme
Court's Commerce Clause analysis in Lopez).
304. Nat'l Abortion Fed'n v. Ashcroft, 330 F. Supp. 2d 436, 486 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
305. Id.
306. Id.
307. Id. (citing Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 937-38 (2000)).
308. Id. (citing Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 970 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); id. at 1017-18
(Thomas, J., dissenting)).
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Court rejected this deference. Therefore, courts should not defer to
Congress's findings regarding the PBABA. °9
By establishing the Turner standard, the Supreme Court "explicitly
holds that Congress could disregard evidence contrary to its findings
provided that the position it accepted was reasonable and based on
substantial evidence. ' 310 Moreover, while Congress cites Katzenbach
as the source for its deference, Katzenbach is distinguishable from the
PBABA; whereas Katzenbach sought to expand a fundamental right,
the PBABA seeks to limit a fundamental right.3 ' When a law denies,
rather than expands, a fundamental right, courts must analyze it with
the strictest scrutiny.312 Therefore, courts reviewing the PBABA,
which limits women's right to choose an abortion, need not give such
rigid deference to Congress's findings.
C. The PBABA's Unconstitutionality Under Section Five of the
Fourteenth Amendment
Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment also does not afford
Congress the power to enact partial-birth abortion bans such as the
PBABA. Unless a state violates a provision of the Fourteenth
Amendment, Congress does not have the power to legislate under
Section Five.313 Congress did not enact the PBABA in response to
any unconstitutional state laws, and thus it had no authority to pass
the PBABA.1 4 Moreover, Section Five does not allow Congress to
design laws regulating privacy rights.31 It restricts Congress to the
rectification of state laws infringing on privacy rights.316 Section Five
does not give Congress the power to infringe on individual rights
unless Congress is reacting to a preexisting state law; since there was
no previous state action, Congress did not have the requisite authority
to enact the PBABA.
Like the RFRA, which the Court struck down in City of Boerne, the
PBABA is overbroad. The PBABA is not enforcing a
constitutionally-protected issue, it is restricting it; under City of
Boerne, Congress may not redefine the Constitution's fundamental
309. See id.
310. Id. at 487 (citing Turner, 520 U.S. 180, 210-11 (1997) (stating that the
"presence of contradictory evidence before Congress does not render its findings
invalid")).
311. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1531 (West Supp. 2004); supra notes 228-30 and
accompanying text.
312. Kushnir, supra note 14, at 1179 (citing Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641,
657 (1966)).
313. See supra notes 141-42 and accompanying text.
314. See supra note 268 and accompanying text.
315. See supra notes 144-48 and accompanying text.
316. See supra notes 146-48 and accompanying text.
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guarantees.317 Like the RFRA, the PBABA has no termination date,
geographic restriction, or predicate. 318 The PBABA does not contain
limitations showing that Congress's means are proportionate to ends
legitimate under Section Five. The restrictions imposed by the
PBABA are disproportionate to any unconstitutional conduct that
might be targeted by the Act. Many states already ban partial-birth
abortion procedures, and perhaps Congress could better enforce the
Fourteenth Amendment by ensuring that these existing state laws are
constitutional."' Thus, the PBABA violates the proportionality test
given by City of Boerne, rendering it an unconstitutional manipulation
of Congress's Section Five power.32°
D. Implications of a Decision Upholding the Constitutionality of the
PBABA
If the Supreme Court upheld the PBABA as constitutional, it would
undo the Stenberg decision. By not requiring an exception for the
health of the pregnant woman and by allowing the vague language to
impose an undue burden on the pregnant woman seeking the
abortion, it would challenge the past precedent given by Roe and
Casey.321 If the Court allows Congress to prohibit abortions in this
manner, it would chip away at the rights previously afforded to
women by Roe and Casey. The Supreme Court would be granting
Congress the power to override the Court, undermining its authority.
In Stenberg, the Supreme Court unmistakably reaffirmed that any
317. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519 (1997) (stating that "Congress
does not enforce a constitutional right by changing what the right is").
318. See supra notes 159-62 and accompanying text.
319. See Clegg, supra note 276, at 31 (asking, "[w]hy is a national ban needed when
half the states have passed such bans? And for those states that have not passed bans
and are not enforcing their murder laws against partial-birth abortionists, why isn't
the better course to sue or otherwise act against the recalcitrant officials?"); supra
note 314 and accompanying text.
320. See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
321. In her concurrence in Stenberg, Justice O'Connor specifically stated that she
would not consider a partial-birth abortion ban constitutional unless it contained a
health exception. Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 947 (2000) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring). Despite this, the PBABA's authors and supporters seemed willing to
gamble that by the time the Supreme Court reviews the statute, the makeup of the
Supreme Court will be different. Gordon, supra note 14, at 512-13. As President
Bush has promised to put partial-birth abortion opponents on the Court, it seems
likely that the ban could be ruled constitutional if a member of the Stenberg majority
retires before the PBABA comes up for review. Id. Justice Blackmun's warning
remains true: "All that remained between the promise of Roe and the darkness...
was a single flickering flame ... I fear for the darkness as four Justices anxiously await
the single vote necessary to extinguish the light." Letter from NARAL Legal
Department, NARAL Pro-Choice America Foundation, to Interested Parties (Jan. 1,
2004) (quoting Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 922-
23 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring)), available at
http://www.naral.org/facts/loader.cfm?url=/commonspot/security/getfile.cfm&PageID
=7879.
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legislation restricting access to abortions must contain a health
exception and cannot be vague.3 22 Nonetheless, Congress enacted the
PBABA, lacking a health exception and using vague language.
323
Congress does not have the power to "legislatively supersede"
Supreme Court decisions that interpret and apply the Constitution.
324
Therefore, Congress must respect the Supreme Court's judgment in
Stenberg, and not attempt to overrule the decision by enacting
legislation such as the PBABA.
Justice Ginsburg warned against passing legislation as a step
towards eliminating the fundamental right to an abortion.3 5 In their
lobbying, Republicans separated the right to choose issue from the
partial-birth abortion issue.326 They referred to the procedure as
infanticide, persuading pro-choice Democrats to support the ban.327
Since the procedure seemed so depraved,328 it was difficult for
advocates to defend partial-birth abortions, leading them to focus on
medical reasons rather than a woman's right to choose.329
Nonetheless, the unpleasant nature of the partial-birth abortion
procedures should not divert the issue away from the inherent
illegality of the PBABA.
The Supreme Court should not only strike down the PBABA as
unconstitutional, it should use language indicating that this is not a
topic under congressional control.330 Only if the Supreme Court
322. See supra notes 77-84 and accompanying text.
323. See supra notes 92-95 and accompanying text.
324. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 437 (2000) (finding an inherent
conflict between the Miranda v. Arizona ruling and a federal statute, therefore
rendering the statute unconstitutional).
325. Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 952 (2000) (quoting Judge Posner, who
proposed that legislatures pass these laws to "chip away at the private choice shielded
by Roe v. Wade")).
326. William Saletan, Bearing Right: How Conservatives Won the Abortion War
233 (2003).
327. Id. at 234 (quoting Senator Pat Moynihan (D-NY) as saying "[partial-birth
abortion] is just too close to infanticide... I'm pro-choice, but this goes above and
beyond what anybody would think of as an abortion"). Republican presidential
nominee Bob Dole added that "[a] partial-birth abortion blurs the line between
abortion and infanticide and crosses an ethical and legal line we must never cross ....
Regardless of your views on abortion-pro-life or pro-choice-we've got to end this
partial-birth abortion." Id.
328. See Gordon, supra note 14, at 505 (noting that the proponents of the PBABA
used the partial-birth abortion procedure's "gory details" to advance their cause).
Representative Forbes asked, "[i]s there no limit, is there no amount of pain, is there
no procedure that is so extreme that we can apply to this unborn child or this fetus
that we are willing as a country to say that just goes too far?" 149 Cong. Rec. H9146
(daily ed. Oct. 2, 2003) (statement of Rep. Forbes).
329. Saletan, supra note 326, at 235 (pointing to pro-choice activists who stressed
that women did not choose to have partial-birth abortions, but rather underwent the
procedure due to medical necessity). Activists proclaimed that the decision to have a
partial-birth abortion must be left up to physicians. Id.
330. See U.S. Const. amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the United States by
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
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makes it clear that federal partial-birth abortion bans are
automatically invalid by virtue of the Commerce Clause and Section
Five of the Fourteenth Amendment will administrations cease from
restricting freedoms in this way.
Congress exceeded its constitutional boundaries by enacting the
PBABA. The Supreme Court should prohibit Congress from
enacting future legislation in this arena. Instead of striking down the
PBABA using a due process analysis, as the Supreme Court did in
Stenberg, the Court should make it clear that the federal government
has no right to regulate in this manner.
CONCLUSION
By the time the Supreme Court has the opportunity to review the
PBABA, the makeup of the Supreme Court might very well be
different. With Republican-controlled legislative and executive
branches, the new Supreme Court might lean further to the right,
especially on the issue of abortion.331 This might sway the Court into
upholding the PBABA.
Sustaining the PBABA, however, would unravel previous privacy
and abortion rights332 and confuse the lines between federal and state
authority. If the Supreme Court finds that the PBABA constitutes a
proper exercise of congressional powers under the Commerce Clause,
then almost any activity could be deemed "interstate" for the
purposes of pursuing federal legislation, effectively overturning the
precedent set by Lopez and Morrison. If Congress obtains its powers
from Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment, then the Supreme
Court will be handing Congress the freedom to legislate in any
manner it deems appropriate, thus ending the important
interpretation that City of Boerne gave in defining Congress's power
to "enforce."
Nevertheless, the Court, when reviewing the PBABA, can avoid
this potential confusion. In reviewing the PBABA, the Supreme
respectively, or to the people."). The Constitution includes other provisions by which
Congress may legislate, yet none are relevant to this discussion. See, e.g., U.S. Const.
Art. I, § 8 ("The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts
and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general
Welfare of the United States; but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform
throughout the United States.").
331. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
332. See 150 Cong. Rec. S4371-01 (daily ed. Apr. 26, 2004) (statement of Sen.
Feinstein) (worrying that "[wie are on a slippery slope toward granting fetuses greater
rights than the mothers who carry them. It may not be long before common forms of
contraception, in-vitro fertilization and stem-cell research are banned in the name of
the unborn"); see also Editorial, Rolling Back Women's Rights, N.Y. Times, Nov. 23,
2004, at A24 (stating that "Americans, and American women in particular, are
officially on notice that post-election, the Republican war on reproductive rights has
entered an ominous new phase").
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Court has the unique opportunity to create a workable and consistent
standard, articulating the bounds of federal powers, and thus
promoting stability. With such a consistent standard, federalism can
contribute to domestic tranquility by affording different resolutions to
many controversial, divisive moral issues.333 With "vigorous judicial
enforcement of federalism," the Court will promote stability over
faction, avoiding the "destabilizing effects of imposing a single
national answer to fractious questions.
334
Through the PBABA, Congress imposes a single national answer to
the divisive conflict over abortion rights. However, the Supreme
Court has expressly hindered Congress's ability to override the
Court's decisions on constitutional issues such as the right to an
abortion. The decisions of Roe, Casey, and Stenberg indicate that the
Court expects legislatures to stay within certain boundaries when
enacting abortion legislation. Laws restricting abortion are
permissible, provided they do not create an undue burden on the
woman seeking the abortion through either vagueness or the lack of a
health exception. Congress must respect those boundaries. The
constitutional separation of powers is essential to maintaining balance
in the federal government. By choosing balance, the Court will ensure
that the different branches of government respect one another's
sovereignty, leading to a more harmonious resolution of nationally
divisive issues. Therefore, in striking down the PBABA as an
unconstitutional exercise of Congress's powers, the Supreme Court
will offer a clear boundary between state and federal powers, and not
undermine years of precedent defining these powers.
333. See Kopel & Reynolds, supra note 208, at 111 (citing Steven G. Calabresi, A
Government of Limited and Enumerated Powers: In Defense of United States v.
Lopez, 94 Mich. L. Rev. 752, 768-69 (1995)).
In [the separation of power doctrine's] major features (of which the
conclusiveness of judicial judgments is assuredly one) it is a prophylactic
device, establishing high walls and clear distinctions because low walls and
vague distinctions will not be judicially defensible in the heat of interbranch
conflict.... Separation of powers, a distinctively American political
doctrine, profits from the advice authored by a distinctively American poet:
Good fences make good neighbors.
Id. at 76 n.75 (quoting Plaut v. Spendthrift, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 239-40 (1995)).
334. Id. at 111.
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